DISASTER HOUSING FOR URBAN ENVIRONMENTS by Krieger, Aisha E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2019-06
DISASTER HOUSING FOR URBAN ENVIRONMENTS
Krieger, Aisha E.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62823
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








DISASTER HOUSING FOR URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 
by 
Aisha E. Krieger 
June 2019 
Co-Advisors: Lauren S. Fernandez (contractor) 
 Shannon A. Brown 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  
Form Approved OMB 
No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
DISASTER HOUSING FOR URBAN ENVIRONMENTS
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Aisha E. Krieger
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)











11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 The purpose of this research was to determine how government agencies can provide more effective 
post-disaster housing in densely populated urban areas where the infrastructure has been damaged. The 
thesis analyzed the problems of previous disaster housing efforts both in the United States and abroad using 
the PESTEL analytical model, which considers the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, 
and legal concerns of a given issue. The research identified issues with the expense of post-disaster housing, 
the availability of land for placement of housing, deployment time, and the unmet needs of victims and those 
living near post-disaster housing. The thesis provides policy recommendations for government stakeholders 
that can address the identified issues. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
disaster, housing, resilience, off-grid, energy, ADA, cost efficient, disaster planning, 
PESTLE framework, Japan Triple Disaster, Mariel Boatlift, Katrina, Puerto Rico, 
Hurricane Maria, Hurricane Irma, Hurricane Harvey, Christchurch, New Zealand, FEMA, 




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
DISASTER HOUSING FOR URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 
Aisha E. Krieger 
Captain, San Francisco Fire Department 
BA, San Francisco State University, 1995 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2019 
Approved by: Lauren S. Fernandez 
Co-Advisor 
Shannon A. Brown 
Co-Advisor 
Erik J. Dahl 
Associate Chair for Instruction 
Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research was to determine how government agencies can 
provide more effective post-disaster housing in densely populated urban areas where the 
infrastructure has been damaged. The thesis analyzed the problems of previous disaster 
housing efforts both in the United States and abroad using the PESTEL analytical model, 
which considers the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal 
concerns of a given issue. The research identified issues with the expense of post-disaster 
housing, the availability of land for placement of housing, deployment time, and the 
unmet needs of victims and those living near post-disaster housing. The thesis provides 
policy recommendations for government stakeholders that can address the identified 
issues. 
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This thesis asks the question: How can government agencies provide effective post-
disaster housing in densely populated urban areas where the infrastructure has been 
damaged? To answer this question, the research analyzes the problems of past disaster 
housing efforts—including the challenges of various operating environments—and 
identifies promising solutions for victims of natural disasters.  
The research focuses on densely populated urban environments, detailing five 
devastating natural and human-induced disasters in the United States, Japan, and New 
Zealand and revealing the need for improved disaster housing due to climate change and 
aging infrastructure. The past issues are analyzed using the PESTEL model—which 
examines the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal aspects 
of a problem—to develop policy recommendations for better housing outcomes. Common 
disaster housing problems, presented in Table A, include arcane laws, bureaucratic barriers, 
the not in my backyard (NIMBY) phenomenon, FEMA’s lack of preparedness, and 
unhealthy and expensive housing options. 
Table A. Disaster Housing Problems Based on a PESTEL Analysis 
Political • FEMA has more than one mission 
• Disaster housing has no constituency 
• FEMA and HUD have differing goals 
Economic • Poor people rely on disaster housing 
• Disaster housing is expensive to create and store 
• Vouchers only work when there is excess housing available 
• Builders are in short supply 
Social • People who need disaster housing have few resources and need help 
• Communities are torn apart when there is no available housing, 
slowing down recovery 
• People who come to the disaster area to help need housing 
• Looters need to be kept out  
xvi 
Technological • Housing is not prepared ahead of time for disasters 
• Aging infrastructure is fragile and cannot be relied on after a 
disaster 
• Disaster housing takes a long time to deploy 
Environmental • Disasters are happening more often 
• Cities are becoming denser 
• More people live in dangerous areas 
• Disaster housing creates huge waste 
Legal • Laws covering disaster housing are complicated 
• Laws are not implemented consistently 
• The average person has a difficult time navigating the system to 
receive aid 
 
To home in on specific problem areas, the thesis details housing responses in the 
aftermath of five disasters: the Mariel boatlift in Florida; Hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans, Louisiana; Japan’s Hanshin earthquake and the Fukushima triple disaster; 
Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico; and New Zealand’s double earthquake. The 
PESTEL analysis for these five vignettes is presented in Table B.  
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The research and analysis reveal that, in all of these disasters, a lack of planning 
and substandard post-disaster housing response slowed down recovery. To combat such 
issues in the future, the thesis recommends policy solutions for disaster housing, 
categorized by PESTEL factors in Table C. In general, disaster housing would be more 
successful if it were created ahead of time, technologically sophisticated, inexpensive, able 
to function off-grid, stackable, and easy to deploy. The recommendations presented in the 
thesis will help stakeholders revise disaster housing policy to better meet these needs. 
Table C. Disaster Housing Solutions 
Political • Coordinate with all stakeholders to reduce areas of overlap or 
gaps in coverage, in particular between FEMA and HUD 
• Create clear path for victims to receive aid 
• Create a consistent disaster housing response 
• Create permanent housing, when appropriate, instead of 
temporary housing 
• Preplan for vulnerable communities 
Economic • Use resources that are local or abundant to create disaster 
housing 
• Allow victims to supplement vouchers so that they can find units 
better suited to them 
• Create disaster housing that can transition to permanent housing 
• Land bank areas so there are places to put disaster housing when 
there is a need 
• Create vouchers for rentals when housing stock is available 
Social • Offer wraparound services to victims 
• Reduce delay of distributing disaster housing by storing units in 
key locations 
• Evaluate vulnerable populations ahead of disasters 
• Allow victims and neighbors to have buy-in on their disaster 
housing 
• Keep communities together and close to home 
• Give disaster housing victims the option to purchase their 
disaster housing 
xix 
Technological • Increase size and change design of disaster units to accommodate 
the elderly and disabled 
• Create an off-grid disaster housing option 
• Create green disaster housing options 
• Create prefabricated disaster housing for quicker deployment 
• Create rapidly deployable disaster housing options 
• Make options transportable by truck, rail, or ship 
• Make options easily storable 
• Create stackable disaster housing 
Environmental • Remove all victims from disaster area to rebuild quickly 
• Keep people close to services and employment 
• Remove populations from dangerous areas such as flood zones 
when possible 
Legal • Increase the amount of time victims can stay in disaster housing 
• Create legislation that allows for flexible floorplans 
• Create legislation that would mandate retrofitting high-risk 
buildings 
• Create legislation to make buildings safe enough to stay in after a 
disaster 
• Create legislation that allows temporary housing to transition to 
permanent housing 
 
Our country, and countries around the world, will continue to experience disasters; 
in anticipation of increased disasters, it is imperative that the United States improve its 
disaster housing policies. An important first step is to streamline the laws and regulations 
that make it difficult for disaster victims to receive the aid they need. It is also important 
to create post-disaster housing that is cost-effective, safe, and keeps people close to their 
homes, families, and work while providing a foundation that helps individuals and 
communities recover economically and socially. 
To achieve these goals, this research recommends planning for post-disaster 
housing ahead of time, rather than addressing the issue on an ad hoc basis after a disaster 
xx 
has devastated an area. A major policy recommendation is creating a dedicated workforce 
such as Job Corps to build and stockpile disaster housing solutions. This dedicated 
workforce could deploy housing quickly after a disaster and reduce housing problems for 
victims while also saving taxpayer money. To create needed disaster housing, FEMA 
should go beyond its standard solution of employing trailers and vouchers and explore 
cutting-edge technological advances. Technology should be used to create off-grid housing 
that has a low impact on the environment and that is easy to move and store, modifiable 
for the needs of the victims, and stackable for high-density areas. By addressing these 
issues ahead of time, disaster housing can be more functional for its inhabitants and less 
costly for taxpayers. 
xxi 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The United States has seen an increasing number of natural and human-induced 
disasters in recent years, including historic flooding in Houston, Texas, in 2017, multiple 
wildfires in drought-stricken areas of California in 2017 and 2018, and violently destructive 
hurricanes, such as Hurricane Irma in 2017. There continues to be a high risk of 
earthquakes on the West Coast, as there are many active fault lines in this region. Scientists 
speculate that hurricanes such as Katrina, Harvey, and Irma are arriving with increasing 
frequency and power due to the warming of the oceans where hurricanes form. Published 
in November 2018, the Fourth National Climate Assessment, the U.S. Global Change 
Program’s quadrennial research and analysis report about climate change, warned of 
increasing natural disasters around the world.1 Disaster housing is needed not only for the 
people who continue to live and work in devastated areas but also for those who come to 
disaster areas to provide aid and rebuild. Federal, state, and local public health officials, as 
well as first responders and legislators, need to prepare for both the real-time exigencies 
and the aftermaths of these predictable disasters.  
The need for post-disaster housing is often overlooked in disaster response 
planning. The federal entities responsible for disaster response and post-disaster housing—
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD)—have relied primarily on trailers and housing vouchers as 
solutions to mass housing challenges in the aftermath of disasters. This is a problem for a 
myriad of reasons: the trailers are difficult to store ahead of time and difficult to place if 
there is no functioning infrastructure or a strong neighborhood association, they are 
expensive, and they are unhealthy for occupants. Damage to housing after a disaster can 
be anticipated and resolved with advance planning, which will help to reduce human 
                                                 
1 D.R. Riedmiller et al. (eds), Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National 
Climate Assessment, Volume II (Washington, DC: U.S. Global Change Research Program), 1, 
http://doi.org/10.7930/NCA4.2018. 
2 
suffering during the recovery process. Preparation for disaster housing can also improve 
the social and economic recoveries of communities stricken by catastrophic events.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
How can government agencies provide effective post-disaster housing in densely 
populated urban areas where the infrastructure has been damaged?  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN  
To answer the research question, this thesis analyzes the problems of past disaster 
housing efforts and identifies promising solutions for victims of natural disasters. It 
examines the scope of past post-disaster environments, describes the challenges of various 
operating environments, identifies and evaluates possible solutions, and offers policy 
recommendations. The research focuses on densely populated urban environments by 
reviewing five devastating natural and human-induced disasters in the United States, Japan, 
and New Zealand through the PESTEL analytical model, which considers the political, 
economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal ramifications of a given 
strategy.2 In their journal article for Management & Marketing, Eliza Bivolaru, Robert 
Andrei, and Geroge Vlad Purcăroiu explain that “PESTEL analysis is useful … because it 
offers a systematic, holistic view of the fields, and the respective organizations and 
institutions, that must be coordinated.”3 The PESTEL model has been used to analyze a 
wide variety of situations around the world—such as the waste-to-energy incineration 
industry in China and the relationship between cloud computing and organizational 
                                                 
2 Doug Forbes, Simon Smith, and Malcolm Horner, “Tools for Selecting Appropriate Risk 
Management Techniques in the Built Environment,” Construction Management and Economics 26, no. 11 
(2008): 1241–1250, http://doi.org/10.1080/01446190802468487. 
3 Eliza Bivolaru, Robert Andrei, and George Vlad Purcăroiu, “Branding Romania: A PESTEL 
Framework Based on a Comparative Analysis of Two Country Brand Indexes,” Management & Marketing 
4, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 111. 
3 
sustainability.4 Because it is a model primarily used in business scenarios, it is grounded 
in real-world scenarios and can therefore solutions that are realistic and practical. 
The thesis is organized into five chapters; after this introductory chapter, Chapter II 
examines literature that describes existing issues with disaster housing, to include theories 
of post-disaster population management. It also analyzes the immediate and longer-term 
impact of these strategies on the affected communities. Chapter III develops five related 
vignettes, each of which focus on two elements of PESTEL: the Mariel boatlift in Florida, 
Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, the Hanshin and Fukushima earthquakes in Japan, 
Hurricanes Maria and Irma in Puerto Rico, and earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand. 
The vignettes were selected because they provide a variety of post-disaster housing issues 
in urban environments:  
• The Mariel boatlift housing disaster, which centered around a mass 
emigration of Cubans to Florida, was caused by human decisions. The 
research in this thesis examines the economic and political impacts on the 
Florida community due to the lack of disaster housing. 
• Hurricane Katrina had vast social and economic impacts on victims as 
well as taxpayers; the research discusses the social and environmental 
impacts resulting from poor planning for and execution of disaster 
housing. 
• Japan’s response to the Hanshin earthquake and the triple disaster in 
Fukushima relied on disaster housing approaches that differ from those in 
the United States. Japan is a highly urbanized first-world country that has 
been notably prone to disasters throughout its long history, including 
earthquakes, tsunamis, and atomic bombs. In a democracy, stakeholders 
                                                 
4 Bivolaru, Andrei, and Purcăroiu, 112; Jinbo Songa, Yan Sun, and Lulu Jin, “PESTEL Analysis of the 
Development of the Waste-to-Energy Incineration Industry in China,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 80 (December 2017): 276–289, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.05.066; Tomayess Issa, 
Vanessa Chang, and Theodora Issa, “The impact of Cloud Computing and Organizational Sustainability,” 
Annual International Conference on Cloud Computing and Virtualization (2010): 163–69, https://doi.org/ 
10.5176/978-981-08-5837-7_185. 
4 
must agree on solutions to enact post-disaster laws and policies, including 
those related to disaster housing. Both Japan and the United States have 
large urban areas as well as remote, less-developed areas, each with their 
own unique needs for recovery. For Japan, the research examines the 
social and economic impact of Japan’s disaster housing solutions. 
• In Puerto Rico, a U.S. commonwealth rather than a state, the lack of 
political representation in Washington, DC, hindered the recovery process 
after hurricanes Irma and Maria devastated local infrastructure. The 
research examines the political and technological impacts of FEMA’s 
disaster housing solutions on the commonwealth.  
• In New Zealand—a country that is similar to the United States—two 
earthquakes struck Christchurch within six months of each other. The 
research on New Zealand’s disaster housing response highlights how well-
intentioned local policies that benefit a small number of residents can have 
consequences for the larger reconstruction effort. The research focuses on 
the social and legal implications of these solutions. 
In Chapter IV, the thesis goes on to analyze housing solutions from the literature 
against the PESTEL model. Finally, Chapter V describes problems with disaster housing 
identified by the research, questions that still need to be answered, and solutions that would 
address current problems.  
The output of this thesis is a set of policy recommendations that have applicability 
to high-density urban communities in the United States. Based on the literature review, it 
appears that no U.S. city has well-developed emergency housing plans that can meet the 
sudden requirements of the aftermath of a disaster. This thesis seeks to address this too-
long-ignored situation with research, analysis, and innovative recommendations.   
D. LIMITATIONS 
This thesis focuses on a problem space within a limited period of time: one to two 
weeks after a disaster, through one to one and a half years later. It does not address the 
5 
immediate need for housing during the first few days after a disaster, nor does it address 
longer-term housing issues or the large-scale permanent relocation of a population that 
elects not to return to an urban center following a disaster. It also does not address the 
special housing needs of incarcerated and hospitalized populations after a disaster. This 
review is extensive but not exhaustive. 
  
6 
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II. EXISTING ISSUES WITH DISASTER HOUSING  
This chapter identifies problems with the creation and deployment of disaster 
housing using the PESTEL analytic model. Providing disaster housing involves multiple 
interdependent factors, and the PESTEL model creates a framework that underlines the 
difficulties of delivering disaster housing as they relate to these factors. This analytic 
framework also highlights the lack of disaster housing options in a disaster zone, which 
can slow economic recovery and destroy communities. The problems range from 
dissatisfied disaster victims and their neighbors to the FEMA trailer debacle after 
Hurricane Katrina.  
A. POLITICAL FACTORS 
FEMA was not created to handle disaster housing and the agency has often been 
unclear about its specific mission in various disaster scenarios. Government officials may 
be averse to spending tax dollars on disaster housing before a disaster strikes because doing 
so takes funds away from needs communities face today. However, once a disaster hits, 
producing disaster housing quickly can be more expensive. What’s more: disaster victims 
and their neighbors are often unsatisfied with the common trailer solution for housing and, 
when no other solutions are available, economic and social recovery is hampered.  
Because disasters have devastating impacts, the federal government plays a large 
role in disaster housing. FEMA, which was originally part of the Cold War civil defense 
effort under the Office of Emergency Preparedness, was created by Congress in 1979 and 
brought together more than 100 programs. From the beginning, FEMA has been charged 
with two core missions: enhance the U.S. government’s ability to survive an attack and 
manage disaster preparedness.5 However, FEMA has not clearly delineated which of these 
missions is most crucial. In addition, other federal agencies have preparedness roles. In an 
article titled “The Truth about FEMA,” James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz note that 
“FEMA has never controlled all federal government emergency preparedness efforts. Both 
                                                 
5 James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, “The Truth about FEMA,” The Heritage Foundation, 
December 7, 2005, https://www.heritage.org/node/16998/print-display. 
8 
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice retained major responsibilities 
in this area.”6 Because FEMA has had many roles and does not retain control over all 
aspects of its responsibilities, it is difficult for the agency to be efficient or effective. 
1. Disaster Housing Does Not Have a Natural Constituency  
Disaster housing does not have a permanent, long-standing, natural constituency. 
Politicians may be reluctant to allocate disaster planning funds until a disaster strikes in 
their jurisdiction. For example, in 2011 Florida Senator Marco Rubio, along with several 
Republicans and the Senate Democrats, voted down a bill that would have not only stopped 
a federal shutdown but would have funded over $3.6 billion for disaster relief.7 In 2017, 
after Florida was hit by several major storms, Rubio changed course and sought to pass a 
comprehensive new disaster relief bill aimed to help victims of Hurricanes Irma, Maria, 
and Harvey, as well as victims of the wildfires in California, because it directly affected 
his constituents.8  
2. Poverty, Politics, and Disaster Relief: Hurricane Harvey 
Hurricane Harvey raged from August 17 through September 2, 2017, dropping 
fifty-one inches of rain on Houston and southeast Texas. Harvey was responsible for the 
deaths of 105 people, and destroyed or damaged 300,000 structures. In the storm’s 
aftermath, 32,000 people needed emergency shelter and 890,000 people registered for 
FEMA aid. Hurricane Harvey caused $125 billion worth of damage.9 Despite the massive 
problems encountered in previous recovery processes, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
                                                 
6 Carafano and Weitz. 
7 William E. Gibson, “Rubio Votes against Disaster-aid Bill,” Sun Sentinel, September 23, 2011, 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-09-23/news/fl-rubio-votes-down-disaster-aid_1_disaster-relief-
disaster-aid-spending-bill; John T. Gasper and Andrew Reeves, “Make it Rain? Retrospection and the 
Attentive Electorate in the Context of Natural Disasters,” American Journal of Political Science  5, no. 2 
(2011): 340–55, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/23025055. 
8 Alex Daugherty, “Nelson and Rubio Urge the U.S. Senate Not to Forget about Disaster Aid,” Miami 
Herald, January 30, 2018, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article197413659.html. 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action 
Report” (report, Department of Homeland Security, July 2018), v, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1531743865541-d16794d43d3082544435e1471da07880/2017FEMAHurricaneAAR.pdf. 
9 
no government contracts with private vendors to provide disaster housing were in place 
prior to Harvey. As a result, housing recovery moved quite slowly. Six months after Harvey 
hit, 8,000 people were still in hotels, 2,000 people were in trailers or RVs, and repairs on 
only 5,000 of 30,000 severely damaged dwellings had been completed.10 
The post-Hurricane Harvey experiences of low-income residents in the Houston 
area provide a vivid illustration of how the difficulties of navigating governmental the 
bureaucracies to obtain needed aid are exacerbated by poverty. FEMA had partnered with 
Texas General Land Office (GLO) for the first time, which delayed response times; the 
GLO had to hire and train people to administer FEMA’s complicated programs.11 Danny 
Vinim, reporting for POLITICO, says that nine months after Harvey made landfall, many 
of Houston’s middle-class neighborhoods had recovered and life had returned to pre-
disaster rhythms. Yet in Kashmere Gardens, where the median annual household income 
was $23,000, most houses remained uninhabitable and many of the neighborhood’s 10,000 
residents were still scrambling for shelter, camping out in one room of their gutted houses 
or living in tents set up on the lawns of their uninhabitable homes.12 
Survivors of disasters are inevitably traumatized in varying degrees, and FEMA’s 
Aaron Skolnik, quoting his subordinates, notes that applying for aid is too difficult.13 
Within this already stressed population, low-income families who may be working multiple 
jobs and struggling with language barriers, disabilities, lack of computer access, and 
childcare face additional impediments to navigating FEMA’s daunting bureaucratic 
                                                 
10 “After Hurricane Harvey,” Coalition for the Homeless, accessed March 19, 2019, http://www.home 
lesshouston.org/after-hurricane-harvey/housing-for-harvey/. 
11 Andrew Natsios, “Hurricane Harvey: Texas at Risk” (report, Texas General Land Office, 2018), 3, 
http://www.glo.texas.gov/recovery/files/texas-at-risk-report.pdf. 
12 Danny Vinik, “Nine Months after Harvey, Middle-Class Houston Has Recovered, but Low-Income 
Neighborhoods Are in Disarray,” POLITICO, May 29, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/29/ 
houston-hurricane-harvey-fema-597912. 
13 FEMA transcript, accessed March 19, 2019, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130919-
1626-27928-9641/transcripts20130919-27928-846378.txt; James M. Schultz and Sandro Galea, 
“Mitigating the Mental and Physical Health Consequences of Hurricane Harvey,” JAMA 318, no. 15 
(October 2017): 1437–38, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2017.14618. 
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maze.14 In Kashmere Gardens, those homeowners who successfully navigated the maze 
were awarded an average of $4,300, an amount that in most cases was insufficient to make 
their homes habitable.15 Although FEMA dispatched personnel to assist Hurricane Harvey 
victims with applications for aid, complex bureaucratic rules and fallout from pre-disaster 
conditions prevented many residents from obtaining the help they needed.16 “People just 
give up,” said Keith Downey, president of a local organization called Kashmere Gardens 
Super Neighborhood, which assists local residents with recovery. And Ben Hirsch, a relief 
worker with Houston’s West Street Recovery, states, “My impression is that low-income 
homeowners in Northeast Houston really have no idea what the hell is going on at all. They 
are very confused…. There’s your FEMA grant and your SBA loan, and PREPS and 
DALHR.”17 
Some residents were denied FEMA aid because they did not have mandated flood 
insurance. Much of the neighborhood was built on a flood plain, and prior to the disaster 
many homeowners were either unaware of laws requiring flood insurance or were unable 
to afford it. At the national level, then FEMA Administrator Brock Long noted at a 
congressional hearing on April 11, 2018, “We’ve got to streamline a very fragmented 
recovery process. Recovery funding comes from 17 different federal government agencies 
and it’s too difficult to understand what you’re entitled to and how to put it to work.”18 
3. FEMA and HUD Friction 
In August 2017, HUD attempted to streamline programs for rebuilding by using 
community development block grants (CDBGs) and the HOME Investment Partnerships 
Program, funded by FEMA and designed to help HUD provide housing and ownership 
                                                 
14 Rosemarie Fike and Stefanie Haeffele, “Getting Federal Disaster Assistance Too Difficult: 
Opinion,” Sun Sentinel, November 27, 2017, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/fl-op-getting-federal-
disaster-aid-difficult-20171121-story.html. 
15 Manny Fernandez, “A Year After Hurricane Harvey, Houston’s Poorest Neighborhoods Are 
Slowest to Recover,” New York Times, March 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/us/hurricane-
harvey-houston.html. 
16 Fernandez. 
17 Vinik, “Nine Months after Harvey.” 
18 Vinik. 
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opportunities for low-income persons.19 HUD was also able to grant ninety-day 
moratoriums on foreclosures and offer Federal Housing Administration loans and 
mortgage insurance. But HUD did not receive funding from FEMA until June 2018, and it 
was nearly a year before the federal government approved $5 billion for HUD to work on 
long-term recovery solutions.20 Delays in reimbursement to HUD meant delays in relief to 
disaster victims. 
4. TSA versus DHAP 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, FEMA focused its funding on the 
Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program and did not implement the Disaster 
Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), which addresses longer-term infrastructure repairs 
and housing, often for poorer communities and individuals. Essentially, TSA pays for 
hotels; DHAP pays for rent. The average TSA allotment (funded by FEMA) is $3,650 per 
month, while DHAP allotments (funded by HUD, through FEMA) are $685 a month. 
FEMA’s TSA program and state-administered programs were able to meet the needs of 
many of those displaced by Harvey, but because FEMA did not implement the DHAP, 
many lower-income people who could not meet TSA stipulations, such as credit card 
deposits in hotels accepting government vouchers, were left without options. The DHAP 
pays the difference between what a victim can afford and their rent, to a given limit. This 
assistance is tapered off over several months and the responsibility for paying rent 
gradually shifts to those living in the rental unit.21 As the National Low-Income Housing 
Coalition points out, using the TSA program instead of the DHAP means that FEMA 
retains control of the money, doling it out instead of turning it over to HUD through the 
                                                 
19 “The Home Program: Home Investment Partnerships,” Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), accessed March 19, 2019, https://www.hud.gov/hudprograms/home-program. 
20 Rebecca Worby, “HUD Approves a $5 Billion Hurricane Harvey Disaster Recovery Plan,” Pacific 
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Recovery Plan,” HUD, June 25, 2018, https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/ 
HUD_No_18_060. 
12 
DHAP, which has been proven to be more cost-effective. The federal government could 
have saved $142 million dollars or housed 3,200 additional families in 2017 by 
implementing the DHAP instead of the TSA program.22 
Communication broke down between FEMA, the state of Texas, and local 
governments, which caused a dearth of information at the local level; that local 
governments had no idea how many people were displaced or if they were getting aid, 
which made it difficult for them to organize and start rebuilding. In the years since Katrina, 
it has been recognized that the speedy flow of accurate data can be an important part of 
recovery. Because renters do not own land, they cannot be offered trailers, or temporary 
housing units, and landlords are hesitant to rent to them because they are not allowed to 
run background checks.23 
After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, FEMA, working in conjunction with the GLO, 
was unable to find adequate housing for those in need. The Coalition for the Homeless, a 
local nonprofit set up in 1982 to combat homelessness in Houston, stated that starting on 
September 7, 2017, a campaign organized under the hashtag #HousingForHarvey found 
700 units in just two months for those who were forced out of shelters as they were being 
closed. This drive to house those without homes allowed landlords to offer rental units for 
six months, and created spaces for 900 people to live safely.24 Renters were able to look 
at a map and pick their locations after landlords, by taking a seminar, had qualified their 
units.25 This is an instance in which state and federal bureaucracies were bogged down by 
                                                 
22 “Setting the Record Straight: FEMA’s Failure to Address Long Term Housing Needs of Survivors,” 
National Low Income Housing Coalition, June 27, 2018, https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/FEMA_Setting-
The-Record-FEMA-TSA.PDF; David Inserra et al., “After the Storms: Lessons from Hurricane Response 
and Recovery in 2017,” Special Report No. 201 (report, The Heritage Foundation, April 2018), 
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24 Coalition for the Homeless, “After Hurricane Harvey”; “Texas GLO Signs Agreement Negotiated 
for Disaster Assistance with FEMA,” Texas General Land Office, September 23, 2017, 
http://www.glo.texas.gov/the-glo/news/press-releases/2017/september/texas-glo-signs-agreement-
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25 Coalition for the Homeless, “After Hurricane Harvey.”  
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red tape, but an existing, smaller nongovernmental organization (NGO) was nimble enough 
to be effective, pointing to the possibility that NGOs can be important partners in securing 
disaster housing.  
Because FEMA had thirty ongoing disasters dating back to 2005 to which it was 
still dedicating resources and personnel, in 2017 the new federal administration decided 
that FEMA would shift disaster housing responsibility for Hurricane Harvey to the state 
and local governments while funding the response.26 This shift was intended to support a 
more proactive partnership in which individuals, local communities, and states would work 
together with NGOs and insurance companies to create better disaster housing results, with 
an estimated 6-to-1 return on dollars spent.27 However, prediction that local and state 
control of disaster recovery would be more efficient and cost-effective did not come to 
fruition. The existing local agencies were woefully underprepared to handle massive needs 
for aid. Although the federal government and the governor of Texas decided to have the 
GLO, instead of FEMA, handle short-term rentals in an attempt to revise disaster relief, 
the inexperienced leader of the agency was quickly overwhelmed by the enormity of the 
task. The GLO could not proceed until it hired more staff, who then needed time to learn 
their new jobs. Of the 40,000 families needing temporary housing, after 100 days only 900 
had received aid, with 199 trailers in place and 367 more on order. Additionally, by the 
time the GLO finally contacted them, 33,000 families had already made other 
arrangements, but there is a strong possibility that these residents were living in unsafe or 
unhealthy conditions in their homes.28  
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https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/07/opinions/fema-shifts-focus-local-governments-for-disaster-
prep/index.html. 
27 Texas General Land Office, “Texas GLO Signs Agreement”; Doug Irving, “RAND Researchers 
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These problems to provide temporary housing speak to the need for clear, advance 
planning about which entities will provide aid, how it will be distributed, and the form the 
aid will come in. Harvey was an example in which local and state governments were 
empowered to run the disaster housing programs but ,due to lack of advance planning, the 
state did not successfully provide disaster housing when called upon to do so.  
A year after Hurricane Harvey, the GLO, with its fresh perspective, developed a 
number of recommendations to improve disaster housing policy so that it is better equipped 
to help victims. The most significant recommendation introduces the option for more 
permanent and cost-effective post-disaster housing instead of limiting such housing to 
eighteen months. “Why spend a hefty chunk of money providing a family with a mobile 
home for just 18 months if there’s another permanent solution that’s cheaper?” asked 
Brittany Eck, a spokesperson for GLO.29 FEMA currently offers several disaster housing 
solutions, including trailers, housing vouchers, low-interest loans, and grants for repairs. 
But with each disaster, FEMA alone determines which response options will be offered in 
that area. Victims are not offered their choice, although giving stakeholders buy-ins for 
solutions has proven more successful.30  
5. Not in My Backyard  
Another, often overlooked, problem with post-disaster housing is the impact of not 
in my backyard—or NIMBY—when situating trailers. NIMBY has become a movement 
of neighborhood groups with political clout whose goal is to keep what they deem as locally 
undesirable land uses (LULUs) out of their neighborhoods. A typical example of NIMBY 
is when an upper-middle class neighborhood blocks a homeless shelter from becoming a 
part of its community. In general, “Residents worry that their enjoyment of the 
neighborhood will be undermined by the clients and that certain clients will be a bad 
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influence on children and young people.”31 While trying to place FEMA trailers in south 
Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina, research found that FEMA did not consider the 
constituent power to block the placement of the trailer parks.32 
With regard to disaster housing, NIMBY makes it much harder to place trailers in 
neighborhoods that commonly have the infrastructure and wraparound services that can 
hasten the recovery process.33 FEMA has long relied on trailers as its primary response to 
post-disaster housing, but trailers can be placed only in areas that have running water, an 
operating power grid, and working sewage disposal. The widespread negative cultural 
perception of trailers contributes to the difficulty of finding suitable locations for them. In 
many cases, landowners have been unwilling to place trailers on their property and have 
fought to keep them out of their neighborhoods, further reducing potential sites for post-
disaster housing.34  
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The cost to taxpayers for post-disaster housing is extremely high; FEMA spent $2.7 
billion on temporary housing after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for example, and HUD spent 
$16.4 billion on disaster housing during fiscal years 2011 through 2013.35 By September 
31, 2017, FEMA had paid roughly $6.6 billion for disaster housing alone after hurricanes 
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Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the wildfires that rocked California in 2017.36 As of 
December 2017, FEMA spent about $150,000 per trailer for disaster housing; this cost does 
not include utilities, maintenance, or upkeep.37 Housing vouchers can be difficult to track 
and very expensive. Through HUD, FEMA paid contractors millions of dollars in 
inspection fees for rentals to verify livability, but no services were rendered. In some cases, 
post-disaster temporary housing is more expensive than the purchase of a new house.38 
The technological challenges of disaster housing can have long-term economic 
effects as well. For example, in 2017, a year in which the United States saw many disasters, 
the necessary quantities of FEMA trailers were not available.39 Further, as previously 
mentioned, trailers must be connected to a functioning infrastructure, limiting where they 
can be placed.40 FEMA’s post-disaster temporary housing was not built to transition to 
permanent housing or to conform with local permanent-building codes because it was 
created as a last resort for people with no other options.41 This lack of foresight exemplifies 
a lost opportunity to reduce waste and find permanent housing for those who have lost their 
homes.  
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1. Owner versus Renter and the Need for FEMA 
Research by Jee Young Lee and Shannon Van Zandt in the Journal of Planning 
Literature shows that the poor are hit harder by a disaster and that they do not ever fully 
recover. They explain that disproportionate numbers of poor people rely on aid for housing 
after a disaster and that poor people tend to rent instead of own, have less money in the 
bank, less stability in their employment, and fewer ties to their community—all factors that 
reduce the likelihood that they will be able to recover without federal aid. According to the 
statistics Lee and Van Zandt discuss in their article, when a disaster hits, poor people cannot 
find alternate housing and rely on FEMA for disaster housing. In a disaster area with 
limited rental stock (like many urbanized cities), demand is high and so prices for available 
housing tend to increase, reducing the chances of renters with vouchers finding alternative 
housing.42 The speedy delivery of housing that is located close to essential services would 
make vouchers a more viable option for poor people after a disaster, during a rental 
shortage. The authors recommend policy changes that include rental repair programs and 
utility payment programs to increase the likelihood that these vulnerable populations might 
recover. 
Statistically, more low-income people live in flood plains and are underinsured than 
those in other income groups.43 When money is tight, flood insurance may be unaffordable. 
Lack of insurance increases the likelihood that a person will need aid for disaster housing 
after a flood or hurricane. Table 1 illustrates the difference in income as it relates to flood 
insurance holders nationwide. It shows that households with flood insurance make almost 
twice as much annually as those that do not have flood insurance, and almost twice as many 
households in the special flood hazard zone do not have flood insurance.44 In Special Flood 
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Hazard Areas (SFHAs), 3.3 million households that are vulnerable to floods do not have 
flood insurance, creating a huge potential housing problem as well as a large bill for the 
taxpayers when a disaster hits these regions. 
Table 1. Median Household Income of Flood Insurance 
Policyholders and Non-policyholders45 





















Number of households is shown in parentheses 
M = millions 
NOTE: Data was weighted using ACS sample weights. Median income was rounded to the nearest $1,000; 
number of households was rounded to the nearest 100,000. 
 
2. Builders in Need of Laborers Now 
To set up disaster housing, workers are needed. Residents and contractors in cities 
like New York and San Francisco are having difficulty, even in non-disaster times, finding 
builders. In a recently published article for Bisnow, Mathew Rothstein notes that while 
New York was having a building boom, many contractors could not fill positions and this 
was slowing down job completions.46 U.S. News reports that builders were looking for 
225,000 construction workers per month nationwide in 2018.47 An October 2018 San 
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Francisco Chronicle headline further states, “Labor Shortage Could Cripple Bay Area 
Rebuilding after Next Big Quake.”48 After a disaster, this shortage of builders will 
negatively impact people who need repairs, slowing down recovery and increasing costs. 
C. SOCIAL FACTORS 
1. Keeping Communities Intact 
Studies show that keeping populations in place after a disaster is vital if the area is 
to recover.49 Two very different studies discuss key reasons why this is so important. The 
first, completed by SPUR, concerns the economic factors discussed in the previous section; 
it shows that moving more than 5 percent of a population away from its home has—beyond 
social implications—serious ramifications on the economic recovery of the affected area 
(this is discussed in greater detail in coming chapters).50 The second study, which 
examined psychological impacts of being moved to a new region after a disaster, was 
completed by the Japanese Red Cross Society to study Japan’s displaced victims two years 
after the triple disaster; the study found that there was an increase in depression and other 
negative mental affects for people who were moved away from their homes.51  
2. Convergence Behavior  
After a disaster, in a phenomenon known as convergence behavior, many people 
are drawn to the area of destruction to offer aid and services, whether or not help has been 
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requested—and these people need somewhere to stay. In an article on convergence 
behavior, Erik Auf der Haide notes that many more people will come than are needed. Auf 
der Haide also notes that fences are needed to keep people from looting, as are locations 
for the collection, sorting, and dissemination of a plethora of donations.52 Another study 
by Binu Jacob et al. echoes Auf der Haide’s conclusion that people are generally generous 
after a disaster, even those impacted by the disaster. The housing needs of people who 
converge after a disaster to offer help should be factored into planning for post-disaster 
housing.53 
While will be converging temporarily on the disaster site, permanent residents will 
be leaving. Those who do stay may be doing so because they cannot leave; many people 
who stay, for instance, have chronic health issues. Dr. Amanda Graves notes that after a 
natural disaster there is a second disaster of shortages, lasting up to three months, of vital 
pharmaceuticals.54 This can be a death sentence for those who are dependent upon blood 
pressure, diabetes, anti-seizure, and other medications. Integrating the vital need for 
medications into disaster housing planning would be a step in the right direction; studies 
indicate that the people who need temporary post-disaster housing are often elderly, poor, 
or have disabilities, and will likely need life-saving medication on a daily basis.55 
Other convergence needs to consider include the need for food preparation sites. 
Disaster workers and volunteers need to be fed. There may be a need for group kitchens at 
disaster sites.  
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D. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS 
A robust and resilient infrastructure is key to the successful functioning of a modern 
society. According to a 2017 report by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 
that assessed the physical conditions of sixteen categories of modern life ranging from 
aviation to wastewater, the infrastructures of cities in the United States are not aging well, 
earning an overall grade of D+, down from a grade of C when the first ASCE report was 
published in 1988.56 This raises serious concerns for disaster preparedness, as it is unlikely 
that already weakened infrastructures will be functioning after disasters of serious 
magnitude. For example, it took eight months to restore limited power in Puerto Rico 
following Hurricane Maria, and despite a $3.8 billion repair bill, the power grid is 
considered likely to fail again during the next hurricane.57 Poorly maintained 
infrastructures may also trigger natural disasters. In 2017, electrical wires downed during 
a windstorm were blamed for the Carr Fire in California, resulting in $1.659 billion in 
damages.58  
Studies show that keeping populations in place after a disaster is vital if the area is 
to recover, but doing so is difficult without a functioning infrastructure.59 As previously 
mentioned, FEMA can only place trailers, the agency’s temporary housing solution, in 
areas that have running water, an operating power grid, and working sewage disposal.60 
Many people in the disaster preparedness field—among them GLO representatives, 
congressional ad hoc  committees, and professional reviewers of public policy—are aware 
                                                 
56 “ASCE’s 2017 Infrastructure Report Card,” American Society of Civil Engineers, accessed March 
19, 2019, https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/. 
57 Michael Weissenstein, “Puerto Rico Power Grid Can’t Withstand Hurricane after Billions Spent,” 
Las Vegas Review-Journal, May 31, 2018, https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nation-and-world/puerto-
rico-power-grid-cant-withstand-hurricane-after-billions-spe. 
58 Richard Gonzales, “PG&E Power Lines Blamed for Northern California Wildfires,” NPR, June 8, 
2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/06/08/618444388/pg-e-power-lines-blamed-for-northern-california-wi. 
59 Mary C. Comerio, “Disaster Recovery and Community Renewal: Housing Approaches,” Cityscape 
16, no. 2 (2014): 56, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326883; Poland, “The Resilient City.” 




of the problems inherent in FEMA’s trailer-and-voucher system of emergency housing, but 
no significant changes have been implemented to improve the state of disaster housing.61 
E. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The effects of climate change are increasing the need for disaster housing; four of 
the most destructive hurricanes in U.S. history have occurred in the past thirteen years.62 
Compounding this environmental issue, more people are moving to urban areas and areas 
at higher risk for disasters, and disaster housing is inhibiting waste-control efforts. 
1. Supersize My City! 
People are moving to cities in large numbers and creating megacities, which are 
increasing in mass either horizontally or vertically.63 For example, “population growth in 
California’s urban centers will surpass land consumption. In the eastern U.S., as well as in 
the Midwest, urban expansion is expected to increase significantly faster than 
population.”64 This urban agglomeration, or blurring of distinct lines between cities, 
changes the ways in which cities relate to each other; in addition to competing, they are 
cooperating as well.65 But after a disaster, when resources are low, cities may compete 
rather than cooperate for limited resources such as disaster housing. With open space 
diminished, it becomes difficult to find placement opportunities for disaster housing. With 
more people moving into high-rises in city centers, there will likely be an increase in the 
need for post-disaster housing. As disasters hit these megacities, trailers will not provide a 
working solution to cope with so many people in relatively small areas.  
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2. More People Are Moving into Danger Zones  
Flooding has emerged as an environmental danger of grave concern. A recently 
published FEMA report notes that many communities in the United States have been built 
on 100-year flood plains. These vulnerable areas have increased in size and are getting hit 
hard. There are no plans to move communities out of these high-risk areas, and people 
affected by future floods are going to need government assistance.66 
Wildfires are part of the natural cycle of renewal in forests, but as climate change 
leads to increased droughts, their frequency and intensity have increased dramatically. 
Ongoing drought was a key factor in California’s 2017 and 2018 wildland fires, the worst 
in recorded history and which claimed more lives as a result of fire in two years than in the 
previous ten years combined, and destroyed more than 26,000 homes.67 As communities 
expand into formerly uninhabited wooded areas, people are vulnerable to loss of life and 
property through wildfires. 
3. Post-disaster Trailers Are Adding to the Storage Problem  
Trailers, which are neither reusable nor recyclable, create another environmental 
problem: vast quantities of waste. When disaster victims find permanent housing, FEMA’s 
post-disaster trailers often end up stored or sold as scrap. After Katrina, FEMA had to find 
a way to store, instead of dispose of, nearly such 100,000 temporary housing units because 
of numerous lawsuits over toxic levels of formaldehyde found in the trailers. The agency 
stated that the litigation slowed FEMA’s efforts to reduce its stock of more than 94,000 
travel trailers it had stored, empty and unused, around the country.68 After the litigation 
was settled, some trailers were sold as scrap and then used as homes by the new owners. 
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Some trailers are still being stored, at a great cost to the taxpayers, while the government 
figures out what to do with these toxic boxes.69 
F. LEGAL FACTORS 
1. Conflicting Options 
The United States relies on the Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency 
Assistance Act to guide its priorities in disaster housing. The Stafford Act was enacted in 
1988 and continues to be the cornerstone of FEMA disaster relief. It was designed to enable 
the federal government to assist the local and state governments of areas hit by natural 
disasters. The Stafford Act mandates that in order to receive funds, local and state 
governments must develop preparedness plans, mitigate hazards as needed, work together 
with other stakeholders, and use the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as the 
operating structure, among other requirements.70 It mandates that this framework be 
adhered to before, during, and after a disaster if a city is to qualify for federal funding, but 
given the potential state of cities after disasters, it may behoove cities to focus on preparing 
for disasters and mitigating hazards ahead of need in order to reduce recovery time.  
In his 2018 article for POLITICO, Danny Vinik notes: 
The Stafford Act itself is a study in contradictions. Lawmakers wanted to 
help communities recover, minimize fraud, and preserve incentives for 
households to prepare for future disasters. But those goals are in tension: 
The more money FEMA provides disaster victims, the less incentive they 
have to prepare for a storm, and the faster FEMA doles out that money, the 
greater risk that some of it will fall into fraudulent hands.71 
The non-profit Sphere Project, initiated in 1997 by multiple humanitarian agencies, 
including the Red Cross, developed the internationally acknowledged gold standard for 
post-disaster housing. Sphere states that the “disaster-affected population should be 
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assisted on the site of their original homes.”72 Sphere also urges that affected populations 
unable to stay near their original homes should be allowed to stay with family or “people 
(with whom) they share historical or religious ties.”73 When assessing disaster housing 
options, Sphere reminds planners of the importance of both the land upon which homes are 
built and the cultural and family ties connected to that land.74  
In his 2010 Congressional Research Service report, Francis X. McCarthy, an 
emergency management policy analyst, discusses challenges to FEMA policies and 
practices. His report echoes Sphere’s conclusions: 
It is critical to anticipate the challenge of providing housing assistance that 
meets diverse individual, household and community needs. Meeting urgent 
housing needs while enabling individuals, households, and communities to 
rebuild and restore their way of life is a complex equation that requires all 
those involved in disaster housing—including all levels of government, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector—to navigate a broad 
range of competing and interdependent factors.75  
These conflicting needs point to the difficulties FEMA faces in developing and 
implementing a cohesive disaster housing response plan that meets the goals of the Stafford 
Act as well as Sphere’s standards, especially given the limitations stipulated by the Stafford 
Act, such as an eighteen-month limit on disaster housing. 
McCarthy also outlines the different options that FEMA offers to serve the housing 
needs of displaced people in declared disaster areas, beginning with temporary housing at 
large facilities, such as sports stadiums, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. For the 
longer term, FEMA offers programs to repair homes and vouchers to pay rent while the 
victims’ homes are being rebuilt. And as a last resort, FEMA offers the option of trailers 
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for post-disaster housing. Each of these programs has a complex set of requirements that 
must be met before people can apply for them.76 
2. Permanent and Semi-permanent Housing Programs 
FEMA has the legal, if rarely used, option to build permanent houses as a disaster 
housing solution when it is less expensive than building temporary housing. Known as an 
eligible created resource, this option was not offered after Katrina or Maria because it was 
very expensive, but may be less expensive than temporary housing that is disposable.77  
The semi-permanent housing program includes the Post-Katrina Temporary 
Disaster Housing Pilot Program, which allows victims to stay closer to home during 
rebuilding, and gives FEMA the option to rent and repair apartments for victims to live in. 
This assistance may be helpful in creating units when rental markets are tight and vacant 
units do not meet federal housing standards.  
McCarthy’s research reveals the need for a more comprehensive disaster housing 
option, but data shows that the manner in which post-disaster housing has been approached 
in the recent past does not reflect this need. For example, an ad hoc committee created to 
address FEMA’s response to Katrina recommended finding another temporary housing 
solution besides manufactured housing units, but after the Carr Fire in California in 2018 
FEMA once again considered using trailers for displaced victims.78 When McCarthy’s 
report was released in August 2010, he noted:  
In anticipation of the release of the strategy, the DHS Inspector General 
posited four different approaches to FEMA’s current practices: Alternatives 
to FEMA being the primary provider of long-term housing include having:  
(1) States assume housing responsibility,  
(2) HUD assume federal coordination of the housing function,  
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(3) FEMA use permanent types of housing in lieu of travel trailers and 
mobile homes, and  
(4) FEMA make lump sum payouts and rely on disaster victims to find 
longer term housing that meets their specific needs.79  
It appears that these four options have either not been employed or have been employed in 
hybridized or truncated forms, leaving many victims without relief.  
3. The Formidable Barrier of Red Tape 
While there are currently many ways for disaster victims to receive housing 
assistance, access to help is impeded by layers of bureaucratic red tape. Because the process 
of obtaining disaster housing has proven difficult to navigate both for the agencies offering 
it and for the individuals in need of it, FEMA distributed the National Disaster Housing 
Strategy Annexes in 2009. In this publication, FEMA acknowledges the bureaucratic 
barriers to relief, stating, “Previous disaster housing efforts could have benefited from a 
better understanding of valuable programs across the entire Federal government spectrum, 
as opposed to within merely one agency’s authorities.”80 This published strategy 
represents FEMA’s attempt to educate the public about the available disaster housing 
programs. For instance, the document explains that if housing vouchers are not appropriate 
in the situation, disaster housing, such as FEMA’s trailers, can be used; the federal 
government, not the victim, chooses which disaster housing options will be offered after a 
given disaster. 
4. The Trailer Option Has Been Costly 
FEMA offers direct assistance in the form of temporary housing units (THUs)—
i.e., trailers and RVs—with trailers being the more common option. As previously 
mentioned, THUs are used if none of the other options are available or are not under the 
Individuals and Households Program cap of $34,000. In addition to the space and access 
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to utilities needed for THUs, there are stringent inside air quality standards for trailers that 
were put in place after Hurricane Katrina.81  
Trailers are a costly option for FEMA, as the agency is responsible for the creating, 
moving, setting up, securing, repairing, getting utilities for, removing, storing, and 
disposing the units. If THUs are set up in a remote location, FEMA must also fund 
wraparound services such as child care, transportation, health care, counseling, and 
schools.82  
In 2007, Congress mandated that FEMA reorganize and create staff positions for 
better disaster housing oversight. In June 2009, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
released a report on FEMA’s THU program and storage site management. The OIG found 
that “because FEMA did not have adequate contract controls in place, it overpaid for 
services, hindered operations and posed potential safety hazards.”83 It also found that 
FEMA needs better oversight of work contracted out to NGOs. The report recommends 
that FEMA hire a staff of trained personnel to monitor contractors’ performance in order 
to verify that they have met their obligations.84  
In December 2009, the OIG released another report, “FEMA Temporary Housing 
Property Management Controls,” which mandates that FEMA must keep better records for 
future disaster housing deployments. An audit of inventory showed that almost half of the 
products could not be located or had incomplete records. According to the OIG, after 
creating several new positions to oversee management of this temporary housing,  
notwithstanding … recent initiatives, the agency [FEMA] lacks adequate 
control over some aspects of its accountable property systems and needs to 
take corrective action to address the conditions that include inaccurate and 
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unreliable data, noncompliance with existing procedures, and the lack of an 
adequate system to manage temporary housing units.85  
The OIG made only two recommendations: that FEMA (1) require the storage sites to 
follow protocol by keeping accurate records and (2) diagnose where there is a dearth of 
data and implement changes to fill these gaps.86 
Storing THUs so that they are ready when needed again is an additional expense, 
so FEMA sells trailers to victims whenever possible. By reducing the number of THUs that 
are being stored, waiting for a disaster, FEMA saves approximately $133 million annually 
on storage costs. In 2010, FEMA was paying storage fees for roughly 120,000 THUs; but 
if FEMA sells too many THUs rather than keeping them on hand for use in future disasters, 
the agency may need to purchase more units in the future and may invite price gouging 
after a disaster.87 This a place where FEMA could do better by looking at other options 
and expanding its institutional imagination. 
In June 2013, the OIG published a report with one recommendation: to eliminate 
the FEMA trailer as a solution to disaster housing. In this report, the OIG states that if 
FEMA does not come up with a better disaster housing solution, the increased cost to 
taxpayers will be $76 million annually.88 Although FEMA agreed with this 
recommendation, it did not comply. When Hurricane Harvey hit in 2017, FEMA again 
distributed trailers to the victims, albeit six months after the fact.89 In the aftermath of the 
northern California wildfires, FEMA also recommended sending 2,000 trailers for use as 
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temporary housing.90 Another OIG report states that FEMA paid $6 million to construction 
companies that billed FEMA for the inspection of sites that were not ultimately usable for 
disaster housing. FEMA acknowledged that it had a problem that needed to be addressed, 
and created a new position within the agency to oversee inspections and disaster housing.91  
G. SUMMARY 
The disaster housing problems described in this chapter—based on the PESTEL 
factors—are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Disaster Housing Problems Based on a PESTEL Analysis 
Political • FEMA has more than one mission 
• Disaster housing has no constituency 
• FEMA and HUD have differing goals 
Economic • Poor people rely on disaster housing 
• Disaster housing is expensive to create and store 
• Vouchers only work when there is excess housing available 
• Builders are in short supply 
Social • People who need disaster housing have few resources and need help 
• Communities are torn apart when there is no available housing, 
slowing down recovery 
• People who come to the disaster area to help need housing 
• Looters need to be kept out  
Technological • Housing is not prepared ahead of time for disasters 
• Aging infrastructure is fragile and cannot be relied on after a 
disaster 
• Disaster housing takes a long time to deploy 
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Environmental • Disasters are happening more often 
• Cities are becoming denser 
• More people live in dangerous areas 
• Disaster housing creates huge waste 
Legal • Laws covering disaster housing are complicated 
• Laws are not implemented consistently 
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III. FIVE VIGNETTES: LESSONS LEARNED 
Each of the five disaster vignettes in this chapter focus on two aspects of the 
PESTEL analysis. For the Mariel boatlift incident, the research examines the economic and 
political impacts on the community due to the lack of disaster housing. The vignette for 
Hurricane Katrina focuses on the social and environmental fallout from the poor planning 
and execution of disaster housing. For Japan, the research examines the response to the 
Hanshin earthquake and the triple disaster in Fukushima with a focus on the social and 
economic impacts  of disaster housing solutions. The Puerto Rico vignette illuminates the 
United States’ response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria and the impact of FEMA’s disaster 
housing solutions with regard to the political and technological impacts on the 
commonwealth. Finally, New Zealand’s disaster housing solution is examined during the 
aftermath of the double earthquakes in Christchurch against the social and legal 
implications. 
A. FLORIDA: THE MARIEL BOATLIFT, 1980—REFUGEE IMPACT ON A 
REGIONAL HOUSING MARKET 
In 1920, roughly 125,000 Cuban refugees arrived in the United States via Cuba’s 
Mariel Harbor over a period of six and a half months; the mass emigration affected 
Florida’s housing market and influenced the local economy as well as local, state, and 
national politics.92 The large number of refugees created a market shock that drove up 
housing costs substantially, which affected Floridians who lived in the area before the 
influx of refugees. The Mariel boatlift incident exemplifies problems of the post-disaster 
relocations on people from urban areas. 
The boatlift was triggered by a failing Cuban economy that was apparent through 
lack of housing and jobs for the people living in Cuba, which increased national tension.93 
From April 15 to October 31, 1980, Cuban President Fidel Castro allowed any Cuban who 
                                                 




wanted to leave the country to exit from the Cuban port of Mariel. These people boarded 
boats bound for the United States, most of which landed in Miami, Florida, a mere ninety 
miles away. Many of the refugees were initially assumed to be criminals, but statistics later 
revealed that only two percent of Mariel Cubans were criminals under U.S. law. These 
individuals were not allowed to stay in the United States or were incarcerated.94   
1. Economic Impact 
The sudden influx of a large number of refugees to a small area around Miami strained the 
communities; low- to mid-range rent costs increased by 8 to 11 percent.95 The influx of 
refugees also forced many people to live in closer quarters or to leave the area, thus 
changing the makeup of the community in four short years. Experts disagree, however, 
about the overall economic impact the Mariel boatlift had on the housing and the job 
markets in Miami. Controversial new data shows that this migration of mostly unskilled 
workers had an impact on local unskilled workforce wages, which dropped by 10 to 30 
percent.96 According to Princeton economist David Card, while the influx was initially 
hard on Miami, in the end it created more wealth for the area.97 
The federal government was unprepared for the sheer number of people who were 
desperate to leave Cuba. It did not have any sort of accommodations in place for refugees 
and fell back on the local government and communities to house them during the intake 
process. Because of this lack of preparation, refugees were placed in unsuitable living 
situations for months while awaiting and undergoing processing by the federal government. 
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Volunteers stepped in to help, and donations from local communities helped ease refugees’ 
discomfort and confusion.98 
There was no way to know the total number of people who would be coming from 
Cuba. An attempt was made to hold and house refugees in a community center in Miami’s 
Little Havana neighborhood, but the facility quickly filled.99 Eventually, refugees were 
taken to the Orange Bowl Stadium and high-profile tent cities were set up under I-95.100 
After refugees were processed they were released from U.S. oversight, and Miami 
experienced a 10 percent increase in population in one month. Dade County Manager 
Merrett Stierheim reached out to President Jimmy Carter for help. Stierheim was referred 
to the National Security Council, whose members recommended staunching the flow of 
immigrants by stopping the boats.101 
2. Political Impact 
“The federal government was totally unprepared,” Stierheim said recently; “As a 
result, local governments really had to step in and relieve the problem.”102 To receive 
federal assistance, Florida Governor Bob Graham declared a state of emergency in Dade 
and Monroe counties. Mariel refugees were housed for weeks, sometimes months, in old 
Navy seaplane hangars while being processed by Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) agents. Florida was so overwhelmed by refugees that many were shipped out to be 
put behind locked fences in prisons and military bases in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and 
Arkansas until their cases could be processed. Conditions in one of these holding facilities, 
Fort Chaffee in Arkansas, were so bad that refugees rioted in protest, and several hundred 
people walked out through an unmanned gate.103 Today, historians cite the handling of the 
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Mariel boatlift crisis as one of the key reasons that Jimmy Carter lost his bid for a second 
term as president of the United States, and it may have cost Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton 
reelection.104   
The mass migration from Cuba to the United States overwhelmed Florida’s 
resources to house those in the lower economic echelons, and fear and anger polarized the 
communities trying to cope. To stabilize the inflow, the U.S. government sought to place 
Mariel refugees in holding facilities until they could be processed by the INS, but this 
process took months to set up. Thus, it fell to the state of Florida and local communities to 
absorb the newcomers, which did not make for a welcoming environment for refugees. 
Locals often viewed immigrants as job and house thieves, and expressed resentment toward 
them. This, in turn, created resentment from refugees, and local tensions rose as people on 
the margins of local housing and job markets struggled to survive in a suddenly more 
competitive environment.105 
3. Summary 
Though the Mariel boatlift crisis was caused by political decisions rather than 
natural forces, preplanning for disaster housing would have made the transition easier both 
for refugees and locals. The refugees had been held in camps for months while processed, 
a solution that would not be amenable for U.S. citizens. After refugees were released from 
the camps, they were not given housing options, which had an impact on the local economy 
by driving up demand for rentals. Refugees were offered vouchers, but this option was not 
successful; rent prices were too high for vouchers to be effective and the stock was too low. 
This housing shortage was compounded by false stories that the refugees were spies, 
criminals, and mentally ill people being deposited by Cuba on the shores of the United 
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States, reducing further rental options—an example of NIMBY. A generation later, the 
area around Miami retains a strong Cuban flavor, but the former refugees and their families 
are Americans, fully integrated into American society.106 
B. NEW ORLEANS: HURRICANE KATRINA, 2005—A PERFECT STORM  
Hurricane Katrina. Katrina, a Category 5 storm, slammed into New Orleans and the 
Gulf Coast in the last week of August 2005, causing approximately $125 billion in damage 
and leaving hundreds of thousands of people without shelter. Many government 
committees and agencies, as well as academics, have researched the successes and failures 
of disaster housing following Katrina; the issue has also been analyzed and reported on 
extensively by the news media.  
1. Social Impact 
Although FEMA spent vast sums of money on disaster housing after the storm, 
many lingering social issues remain nearly fourteen years after Hurricane Katrina. After 
the storm, some trailer parks experienced drug and crime problems, and some residents in 
temporary housing did not feel safe.107 
A disproportionately large percentage of the population using post-disaster housing 
after Hurricane Katrina was composed of elderly people and people with disabilities. The 
Uniform Federal Accessibility Standard mandates that 5 percent of disaster housing must 
be compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), but studies show that more 
than 5 percent of residents who needed housing after Katrina were disabled.108 One post-
Katrina case study revealed that 43 percent of displaced households included a person with 
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disabilities and 30 percent of these families included someone in a wheelchair.109 In 
addition, the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standard was not clear in defining its mandated 
specifications for ADA compliance.  
2. Environmental Impact 
In the rush to create disaster housing in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA 
purchased 120,000 temporary housing trailers from three vendors. These trailers turned out 
to be unsafe for habitation, with forty times the allowable limit of formaldehyde, as well 
as other toxic fumes and mold.110 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has 
spent $3.4 million to track the health of people who lived in these trailers.111 Post-Katrina 
housing lawsuits abound. In 2012, a class action lawsuit resulted in judgments against the 
companies that built and installed the formaldehyde-heavy trailers, which were fined $47.7 
million.112 Congress has spent countless hours in hearings and legislative debates 
discussing the ongoing problems associated with FEMA trailers. 
3. Summary 
Hurricane Katrina devastated an already impoverished area of the United States. 
Disaster housing solutions compounded existing socioeconomic problems by destroying 
communities through relocation and creating an unreasonably high taxpayer bill that did 
not address the underlying issues of the people who needed assistance. The effects are still 
being felt nearly fourteen years later. The unfit trailers were put into long-term storage 
because of their toxicity to humans, where they took up valuable land and caused people 
nearby the storage sites to fall ill.113  
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C. JAPAN: 1995 HANSHIN EARTHQUAKE AND 2011 FUKUSHIMA 
TRIPLE DISASTER—HIT HARD 
1. The Great Hanshin Earthquake 
In 1995, the magnitude 7.9 Great Hanshin earthquake in Kobe, Japan, left 6,434 
people dead. The quake destroyed 104,906 houses, leaving people from 186,175 
households without shelter. An additional 144,274 houses were partially damaged, creating 
274,182 households in distress. In Kobe’s old city center, 192,000 buildings were damaged 
beyond repair.114  
Of those displaced by the earthquake, 100,000 needed disaster housing. The 
government estimated it would take two months to create 48,000 temporary units 
consisting of two small rooms, a small kitchen, and a bathroom, with no storage—about 
the size of a FEMA trailer. Construction ended up taking seven months because it was 
difficult to procure the materials locally. Although the local government made an effort to 
place these temporary shelters in open areas close to the victims’ homes, the lack of 
available space in Kobe meant that most of the temporary homes had to be placed far away. 
a. Social Impact 
The structures destroyed by the earthquake were occupied primarily by elderly 
people, students, working class families, and the poor, with elderly, disabled, and single 
parents making up 70 percent of that population that needed disaster housing; when they 
were moved away from the center of Kobe and their community, these individuals became 
isolated.115 Many had to travel up to two hours to reach services, shops, and community 
organizations. Social workers who worked with the disaster victims found that giving 
people housing did not necessarily lead to their recovery. The social connections the 
victims had lost due to displacement and relocation precipitated a high rate of depression 
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among the survivors. Many people became depressed because they were no longer part of 
their social network. Over 200 elderly people died within the first five years in their 
temporary housing.116  
Policies surrounding temporary housing and subsequent moves to permanent 
housing created a rift in the community; the policies stipulated that displaced persons must 
first live in shelters before they could qualify for temporary housing. Because no one else 
was considered for low-income housing, this policy further stressed the social fabric of the 
community.117  
b. Economic Impact  
The economic impact of disaster housing following the Great Hanshin earthquake 
was complicated and long-lasting. People displaced by the earthquake were moved out of 
the city center to more remote locations, and approximately 100,000 people moved to other 
areas of Japan. This exodus slowed down recovery by reducing the number of people left 
in Kobe to rebuild the city.118 
Additionally, disaster housing recipients relied on the temporary housing for longer 
than intended. The law mandated that this housing be used for a maximum of two years; 
three years after the disaster, however, 45 percent of the units were still inhabited.119 
Because temporary disaster housing was located up to two hours away from Kobe, it 
became challenging for the people to work their jobs and rebuild their businesses. 
Toshihisa Toyoda of Kobe University notes: 
During the initial three years, strong demand-pull effects caused by 
reconstruction activities are observed, and gains rather than losses are 
produced in the second year. Surprisingly, after the fourth year, the amount 
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of flow losses became worse and worse, recording the bottom loss in 2003, 
the 10th year after the quake.120  
Researchers also discovered that in the years after the earthquake, part-time and full-time 
jobs went unfilled due to a labor supply shortage. This economic downturn after an initial 
increase due to reconstruction is thought to be attributable to the fact that so many people 
left on their own or were removed from their homes and businesses in the center of Kobe. 
When fewer people live in the area, recovery is slower.121 
2. The Triple Disaster 
Sixteen years after the Great Hanshin earthquake, Japan suffered another crisis that 
required extensive disaster housing. On March 11, 2011, Fukushima, Japan, was hit by a 
9.0 earthquake, a 128-foot tsunami, and the largest nuclear generator meltdown in the 
country’s history. These disasters are collectively known as the triple disaster, with a death 
toll of around 19,000.122 After the disaster, 110,000 people needed housing. To respond to 
this crisis, about 53,000 prefabricated housing units were built under the same 1947 law as 
the units used following the Great Hanshin earthquake. The law mandated that living 
quarters not exceed 30 square meters (323 square feet) and be used for a maximum of two 
years.  
a. Social Impact  
Five years after the Fukushima disaster, 35,000 people still considered their 
temporary units home. Unlike Kobe, a modern city where the government was able to 
procure at least some vacant units to house displaced victims, in rural Fukushima there was 
scant opportunity to find any vacant units, and most victims who needed housing had to 
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relocate further out. Due to the erosion of coastal land from the tsunami and the 
contamination of land from the nuclear meltdown, prefab structures were created elsewhere 
to house entire communities. Exacerbating the problem of creating new, permanent homes 
for people, many builders were working to prepare Japan for the 2020 Olympics and were 
unable to assist with the building of permanent homes in this region.123   
Also slowing down the recovery process was the attempt to create a cohesive plan 
for each town, prefecture, and the region as a whole due to laws mandating that decisions 
be made by the governor of each township. Governors need input from constituents to do 
this, and many residents no longer lived in the area or were unwilling to return to the area 
due to health concerns, which added to the difficulty of creating a legally viable plan.  
After the triple disaster, the social fabric of the community was damaged when 
residents were relocated. No longer living near each other, families and communities were 
torn apart, further slowing recovery efforts and raising new concerns.124 If only 50 percent 
of residents return to their old homes after a disaster, for example, these residents will again 
be isolated.125 
Addressing the reality that people had grown reluctant to move out of temporary 
housing, the Japanese government put a time limit on how long people who were displaced 
could continue to receive funding while living somewhere other than the original site of 
the disaster. The government made funding contingent on residents returning to the area. 
Those affected were frustrated and confused because only designated areas were being 
rehabilitated; also, some past residents felt that the government was rushing the cleanup 
process and did not trust that they could remain healthy if they returned to their old homes. 
Additionally, the seawall in and around Fukushima needed to be repaired and strengthened, 
and it will take another forty years to dismantle dismantling the power plant.126 
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The majority of people still residing in short-term disaster housing are elderly. 
Since many do not intend to return to their old homes, they are forced to cope with isolation 
from family and community, cramped quarters, no storage, lack of insulation, and the mold 
and condensation that these disaster houses offer.127 As noted in the International Journal 
of Environmental Research and Public Health: 
[The evacuees’] mental health status had also been affected by loss of 
employment and/or community ties due to the nuclear disaster and 
residential relocation with consequent drastic changes in their living 
circumstances.128 
Even though the government helped move people away from the disaster, the social 
ramifications are far-reaching. Four years after the triple disaster, roughly 3,200 people had 
died from illnesses exacerbated by the event, or from suicide. Only 15 percent of the needed 
29,000 permanent homes have been rebuilt.129 
b. Economic Impact  
After the triple disaster, 154,000 people were resettled away from the damage so 
the area could be cleaned up and rebuilt; within this cohort, 81,000 were mandated to leave 
and 73,000 left voluntarily.130 Due to the dangers of radiation, there were no longer people 
living at or near ground zero in Fukushima, and many workers had to be hired from other 
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areas. According to Reuters, when people are imported for work their wages can be 
skimmed by up to 50 percent by the contracting agency.131  
An estimated 140,000 to 200,000 people—mostly farmers, fishermen, and self-
employed persons—lost their jobs because of the triple disaster.132 Five years later, nearly 
60,000 people were still living in temporary housing, away from their former homes and 
communities.133 Twenty-five percent of available jobs near Fukushima go unfilled. 
Women and children, who are at the biggest risk from radiation, have moved away from 
the area while the husbands and fathers who stayed behind struggle to support two 
households.134 One study looking at Japan’s program to hire locals to rebuild the 
communities hit by the triple disaster noted, 
The catastrophic damage to the fishing and marine product industry in 
Minamisanriku meant that large numbers of people immediately lost their 
means of making a living. If people move away from a town even 
temporarily in search of work, they may not necessarily return, even if the 
town’s infrastructure is restored. Once the people are gone, the town will 
not be able to maintain its industry and will go into decline. Minamisanriku 
therefore needed a means of maintaining its residents’ livelihoods until it 
had recovered.135 
This study points to the fact that moving communities into disaster housing away from 
their former homes has lasting effects on the economy and reduces the chances for the area 
to recover once it is rebuilt.   
The Japanese government did offer another solution that was employed after the 
1995 Hanshin earthquake: using existing vacant rental units to house evacuees, with the 
government paying the rent. While this solution was successful in Kobe, it had mixed 
results in the area around Fukushima. The vacant unit rental system in Kobe was useful 
                                                 
131 Antoni Slodkowshi and Mari Saito, “Help Wanted in Fukushima: Low Pay, High Risks and 
Gangsters,” Scientific American, October 12, 2012, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/special-
report-help-wanted-in-fukushima-crime/. 
132 Nagamatsu and Ono, “Job Creation after Catastrophic Events,” 113. 
133 Hu, “5 years after Japan Disaster.” 
134 McCurry, “Fukushima Evacuees.” 
135 Nagamatsu and Ono, “Job Creation after Catastrophic Events,” 117. 
45 
because people were able to live in apartments of normal size, with insulation and standard 
comforts. However, because it separated families and communities and the units were not 
necessarily close to where people had lost their homes, this solution also presented 
problems.136 Impediments to wider use of this post-disaster housing solution include a cap 
of 100,000 yen a month for a family of five or more, and 75,000 yen for a family of four 
or fewer. If a disaster were to hit high-rent Tokyo, these parameters would only allow for 
a one-bedroom apartment. There are not enough vacant units within this price range to 
accommodate potential survivor needs if a 7.3 earthquake were to hit Tokyo. The law also 
does not consider that people might potentially be interested in self-subsidizing partial rents 
to receive a larger apartment, so this option is not currently available. When interviewed, 
a representative of disaster housing in Japan stated that there was no interest in modifying 
the law because doing so would encourage people to continue to live longer in what is 
supposed to be temporary housing.137 The eighteen-month limit for temporary disaster 
housing is the same as in the United States. 
3. Summary 
Well-intentioned laws can have unintended consequences, such as a time limit on 
temporary housing that is not realistic or a structure that is too small for comfortable living. 
Japan also struggled to keep communities together to reduce the social devastation. As a 
result of moving entire communities, economic recovery was stunted. 
D. PUERTO RICO: HURRICANES IRMA AND MARIA, 2017—
DEVASTATED ISLAND 
Puerto Rico is unique in the United States. Comprising 3,500 square miles of land 
located 1,000 miles off of the Florida coast, Puerto Rico is not a state but rather a 
commonwealth of the United States. This means that while Puerto Rico is a part of the 
United States and the 3.3 million people who live there are U.S. citizens, they cannot vote 
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in U.S. presidential elections and have no representation in either the House of 
Representatives or the Senate. Puerto Ricans do vote for their governor and have a non-
voting representative in the House. As citizens of the United States, Puerto Ricans can 
freely move between the United States and Puerto Rico..138  
In the fall of 2017, two powerful back-to-back hurricanes slammed into Puerto 
Rico, causing massive damage to an already poverty-stricken island. The first, Hurricane 
Irma, hit the Caribbean as a Category 5 hurricane from August 30 through September 13, 
2017, and reached Puerto Rico on September 6. It was the fifth most costly hurricane to hit 
the United States, with sustained winds of 185 miles per hour that went on for thirty-seven 
hours.139 This hurricane sideswiped Puerto Rico, killing four people immediately and 
cutting power to about 1 million. About 34 percent of the population lost access to clean 
water.140  
The second storm, Hurricane Maria, battered the Caribbean and surrounding areas 
from September 16 through October 2, 2017. This hurricane hit Puerto Rico directly on 
September 20 and reportedly caused 2,975 deaths. Hurricane Maria, a Category 4, was the 
strongest to hit Puerto Rico in eighty-five years.141 It caused approximately $100 billion 
in damages, leaving 62,000 people without power seven months later. As many as 300,000 
homes sustained significant damage.142  
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1. Political Impact 
Because Puerto Rico has no vote in Washington, it is unable to exert political 
pressure to receive the same aid that is given to people on the mainland. And because 
Puerto Rico is not a state, its citizens do not have the same socioeconomic standing as their 
counterparts on the mainland. Due to U.S. shipping laws, Puerto Ricans pay more for 
international goods than people on the mainland. As noted by CNN, “Because over a 
century after becoming property of the United States, they have no choice but to scrape 
by—a Caribbean colony, paying taxes without representation in Congress and voting only 
in presidential primaries.”143 Governor Ricardo Rossellό laments, “In terms of the 
response, in terms of the unnecessary bureaucracy, in terms of the lack of urgency, for 
example, of the Corps of Engineers, it is likely that being an American territory and being 
second-class citizens is playing a huge role.”144   
Most of the bureaucratic problems facing Puerto Rico after Hurricanes Irma and 
Maria had also been documented after Hurricane Katrina, but subsequent FEMA housing 
deployment problems continue to plague those in need of disaster housing.145 In 2018 
FEMA made strides to provide housing in Puerto Rico. According to the FEMA website, 
the Temporary Shelter Assistance (TSA) program funded 7,000 families in over 1,000 
hotels in forty-one states, Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico.146 The TSA option became 
available to Puerto Ricans a month and a half after hurricanes Maria and Irma hit.147 But 
a key feature of the TSA program is that it only lasts six months, after which many 
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survivors have no choice but to couch surf, sleep in their cars, and otherwise seek shelter 
in places they would not normally live.  
The U.S. government has allotted $717 million for housing assistance in Puerto 
Rico. This may seem like extensive aid, but New York Times reporters who went to Punta 
Santiago, Puerto Rico, one year after Hurricane Maria’s landfall found that while middle 
class neighborhoods were mostly back to normal, poorer neighborhoods have not been 
restored. Many of the 163 homes toured by the Times reporters show signs of devastation, 
with black mold, no roofs, no electricity, no running water, and no aid coming in the near 
future from FEMA or anywhere else. FEMA claims that its presence in Puerto Rico is 
intended as a leg up, not to restore properties to pre-disaster standards. This is 
understandable but impractical; only 15 percent of Puerto Rican survivors had 
homeowner’s insurance, and only 3 percent had flood insurance. Part of the problem for 
FEMA stems from the lack of clear land ownership for many Puerto Ricans. Without a 
clear title, FEMA will not give survivors aid for house repairs. Many survivors have had a 
hard time locating the documentation they need to qualify for FEMA aid amid the ruins of 
their homes.148 Also, because of the way property is passed down from family members, 
sometimes paperwork is incomplete or lost. This may be because Puerto Rico is a 
commonwealth and not a state and used to be under Spanish rule. Currently, Governor 
Rossellό is pushing to grant 48,000 squatters the deeds to their properties at an estimated 
cost of $30 million, creating political tension with the federal government.149 
Of the 1.1 million households that requested FEMA aid, 754,336 houses were 
inspected and 138,572 households received grants for repairs. Two-thirds of those that 
received grants received less than $3,000. Only 3,300 people—1 percent of the 
population—received the maximum grant of $33,000.150 To compare Puerto Rico’s 
response from FEMA with the response in Texas after Harvey, nine days after the Harvey, 
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FEMA had approved $141.8 million in individual assistance to Texas victims on the 
mainland; the amount for victims of Maria in Puerto Rico was just $6.2 million.151 The 
median grant given to Puerto Rico for repairs was $1,800, compared to the median of 
$9,127 given to survivors of Harvey in Texas. In total, victims of Hurricane Harvey 
received twice as much help as victims of Hurricane Maria.152  
FEMA stated that Maria victims did not need Disaster Housing Assistance Program 
(DHAP), the program that helps the lowest income survivors with longer-term 
solutions.153 This was an unprecedented decision, but FEMA deemed that DHAP was 
unnecessary and inefficient for victims in Puerto Rico, although the governor of Puerto 
Rico and many others had advocated for it.154 The dire difference between FEMA dollars 
spent in response to hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria points to the fact that, without 
political clout in Washington, DC, the needs of all American citizens are not taken 
seriously. This made disaster response much harder for those in Puerto Rico, especially 
after disastrous storms in Texas and Florida, states with strong political clout in 
Washington, because all three disaster sites were competing for the same funding. 
As President Donald Trump mentioned, “Puerto Rico is an island surrounded by 
big water.”155 This geography has compounded disaster relief by driving up transportation 
costs and slowing down recovery. Another political issue slowing down recovery is the 
Jones Act of 1920, which mandates that all goods shipped between U.S. ports must be 
shipped on American ships. International ships must offload cargo on the U.S. mainland 
and then goods must be reloaded on U.S. ships to go to any U.S. island, including Puerto 
Rico and Hawaii, thus driving up costs of goods. While the Jones Act was waived for a 
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limited time due to political pressure after the hurricanes struck Puerto Rico, it is once 
again in place, and there is no bill being considered to repeal this nearly 100-year-old law. 
Without representation in DC for Puerto Rico, this issue is unlikely to be addressed.156 
2. Technological Impact 
Technological challenges in Puerto Rico after Maria and Irma were complicated 
and exacerbated by widespread poverty. However, amazing ingenuity and creativity did 
help some victims. For example, Carlos Ocasio and Pablo Perez Medina created a 
communications solution, and Jesse Levin created an innovative point-of-sale mechanism 
that enabled grocery stores in Puerto Rico sell needed food.157 But there was no power on 
the island for many months, and the main cross-island road was so damaged that getting 
from one side of the island to the other, a trip that used to take three hours, took three days. 
As William Villafane, chief of staff to the governor of Puerto Rico, told NPR, “We are 
without power, without water service. No hospital has power service. Our streets are all—
you just can’t go through. When you go through and you have to literally take out the trees 
that are on the streets—it’s the worst hurricane ever.”158  
FEMA cannot address disaster housing needs without a functioning infrastructure. 
No power in Puerto Rico meant no running water, no cell service, and no refrigeration.159 
Sewage treatment also requires power. Without a working power grid, fishermen could not 
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refrigerate their catch, endangering their means of livelihood and adding to the difficulty 
of paying for repairs to their homes.160 
It was difficult for FEMA to find disaster housing solutions when two of its 
options—finding available local rentals and FEMA trailers—were not viable. The first 
option, finding available local rentals, is predicated on the availability of vacant rental 
housing stock, which had all been destroyed in the hurricanes; the second, deploying 
FEMA trailers, requires a working infrastructure. Both were lacking after the hurricanes. 
To address the issue of temporary housing, FEMA distributed 170,000 tarps to be used as 
a temporary “blue roof” housing solution; as of 2019, many residents still have tarps as 
roofs.161 These tarps were intended for people to install themselves, but 70,000 people 
signed up for installation by the Army Corp of Engineers, which created a huge backlog.162 
When Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico, more than 44 percent of the population 
lived below the poverty level, leaving them with no financial safety net. Per government 
officials, more than 1 million dwellings had been built or modified without permits, 
creating circumstances that exacerbated Maria’s devastation.163 The U.S. government has 
spent $3 billion dollars repairing homes in Puerto Rico, but did not take into consideration 
the abject poverty of much of the population as well as unclear titles to homes, factors that 
have slowed down the rebuild. On the lack of rehabilitation of many homes in Puerto Rico, 
the New York Times notes that, “even after years of responding to devastating storms, the 
federal government struggles to help get people back in functioning homes after a natural 
disaster.”164  
The United States has put billions into Puerto Rico’s power grid, but reports state 
that another hurricane could knock it out again.165 Some of those billions disappeared into 
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the $300,000 given to Whitefish Energy, a tiny—with only two listed employees—but 
politically connected firm based in Montana that was hired to rebuild the grid; Whitefish 
Energy was fired soon after arriving in Puerto Rico and the media revealed its connection 
to DC.166 The Army Corp of Engineers was then tasked with rebuilding the devastated 
grid, an undertaking previously outside its purview.167  
Additionally, due to broken water pipes and limited availability of bottled water 
during the first months after the disasters, many people drank tainted water. Illnesses and 
deaths due to leptospirosis spiked. The outbreak compounded deaths in hospitals, where 
doctors and other health-care professionals worked in the dark and under unsanitary 
conditions. With limited fuel for generators, doctors were forced to choose which patients 
could stay on ventilators and dialysis machines, increasing deaths by 1,000 people a month 
when compared to pre-hurricane totals. According to a recent study by George Washington 
University, lack of power effectively increased the hurricane-attributable death toll from 
the originally published 64 deaths to 2,975.168  
3. Summary 
Disaster housing requires working infrastructure to function. After the hurricanes, 
Puerto Rico did not have electricity, internet, water, or usable roads. Much of Puerto Rico’s 
housing stock was subpar to begin with. The island’s devastation was compounded by a 
lack of political clout in DC, which had been cumulative since the island became a U.S. 
commonwealth. This lack of political influence translated into less federal funding, so that 
the infrastructure was not improved over time. Without this influx of funding, Puerto 
Rico’s fragile infrastructure was destroyed, along with most of its housing, when the two 
hurricanes hit. FEMA’s response was to give the victims vouchers for hotels, which under 
federal law only last for six months. The problem was that people with destroyed homes 
needed financial assistance to repair their homes, not to stay in a hotel. Puerto Rico also 
direly needed to have its infrastructure modernized using technological advances. Without 
                                                 




representation, this constituency is essentially powerless to improve its situation by 
political means.   
E. NEW ZEALAND: TWO EARTHQUAKES, 2010 AND 2011—BUILDING 
CODES NOT STRONG ENOUGH 
New Zealand is still coping with the effects of two earthquakes in Christchurch, 
one on September 4, 2010 (7.1 on the Richter scale), and another on February 22, 2011 
(6.3 on the Richter scale). These quakes damaged 10,000 homes and businesses. Seventy 
thousand people, or one-fifth the population of Christchurch, were displaced at least 
temporarily as a result of these disasters.169 
1. Legal Impact 
The city of Christchurch had tried to prepare for earthquakes by implementing 
modern building codes, which proved to be inadequate. A member of the Christchurch City 
Council noted, “Even technologically advanced countries with modern building codes are 
not immune from earthquake disasters. The Christchurch earthquake carried an additional 
message: Urban devastation can be triggered even by moderate-sized earthquakes.”170 
Although the second earthquake was weaker on the Richter scale, the devastation it caused 
was much more severe because the epicenter of the earthquake was nearer to the city and 
closer to the surface.171 
2. Social Impact 
New Zealand was not prepared for the devastation of these two earthquakes. The 
disaster housing response was heavily reliant on insurance companies, faith-based groups, 
and the Red Cross and other NGOs. The New Zealand government’s role was to provide 
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shelter to those relatively few people who were not assisted by the aforementioned groups. 
Scholars who study the effects of the Christchurch earthquakes note that most people 
displaced by the earthquakes found shelter in the homes of friends or families, and in hotels 
and motels. Governmental shelters were in operation, but the government did not offer 
other, longer-term housing options.172 
Because the government of New Zealand had not been adequately prepared or 
organized, it needed to create additional governmental work groups after the first 
earthquake to find a hybrid housing solution that could last between two weeks and six 
months. These groups investigated longer-term solutions that were both self-contained and 
transportable, in the form of campers (trailers). In addition, temporary accommodations 
that would not normally have been allowed by city code were permitted by the 
Christchurch City Council to house the influx of construction workers and builders during 
recovery. The New Zealand Department of Building and Housing requested 2,500 modular 
units, and hundreds of campers were purchased as an interim measure until modular homes 
could be acquired. The department found four sites for “villages” in the suburbs of 
Christchurch in which to situate these modular homes. Once the villages were set up, the 
government had a hard time filling them and, as a result, only three villages were 
populated.173 
In 2014, the Office of the Minister for Social Development (MSD) studied the 
population still displaced by the earthquakes three years after the fact and made 
recommendations to improve future disaster response. The MSD determined that the root 
causes of the increase in displaced persons were a reduction in low-cost housing, and the 
influx of workers to assist with the rebuilding.174 Because disaster victims who had 
personal resources did not rely on the government, NGOs, or faith-based groups for aid, 
the people who did need help were at-risk groups, including people who were 
impoverished, disabled, or addicted. To better serve these at-risk groups, the MSD 
                                                 
172 Giovinazzi et al., 3. 
173 Giovinazzi et al., 9. 
174 Giovinazzi et al., 7.  
55 
investigated ways to alleviate the increased homelessness problem that resulted from the 
earthquakes. The office found that it needed to rent motels for at-risk populations such as 
families or people with disabilities, mental health issues, and addictions to provide the 
modicum of stability needed to jump-start the recovery process and allow these populations 
to become self-sufficient. MSD proposed a six-step transition approach, which included 
wraparound services (social services) such as budgeting, counseling, advocacy, and 
employment so that the housing gains made for the at-risk population could be 
sustained.175 
3. Summary 
The people of Christchurch were surprised by the effects of the earthquakes on their 
modern buildings. They had expected their building codes to protect them from the 
resulting devastation. After finding out that their buildings would remain vulnerable, they 
investigated ways to reduce the number of victims needing government resources in the 
future. They found that poor people and workers coming to the area needed housing but 
wanted housing that was convenient to city services, not in the suburbs. By proactively 
addressing the issue of homelessness, they discovered that the number of disaster victims 
who needed federal aid could be reduced in the future. 
F. SUMMARY 
The disaster housing problems described for each of the vignettes in this chapter—
based on the PESTEL factors—are summarized in Table 3. While the chapter focused on 
only two factors of PESTEL for each vignette, other common disaster housing problems 
emerged that have been added in the appropriate categories in Table 3. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS TO DISASTER HOUSING PROBLEMS FROM 
THE LITERATURE  
This chapter, using the PESTEL framework, focuses on research from around the 
world that addresses solutions to disaster housing. While there are specific disaster housing 
solutions, no universal solution has been created. In Procedia Engineering, Daniel V. 
Perrucci, Bianca A. Vazquez, and Can B. Aktas note that no perfect form of temporary 
post-disaster shelter has yet been devised. The authors recognize that, “To date, an 
engineered solution to the problem that is low-cost, quick to construct, environmentally 
and socially sustainable, takes into account the needs of the occupant, and accounts for 
local climatic conditions has not been found.”176 However, the researchers discussed in 
the following sections have found a way to balance the PESTEL factors—political, 
economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal—discussed in the previous 
chapters.  
A. POLITICAL FACTORS  
The National Low-Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) has put forth policy 
recommendations that bolster FEMA’s responses to natural disasters and that would 
improve the government’s response efforts for those who need it most: the elderly, 
disabled, and poor. For instance, the NLIHC believes FEMA should partner with other 
federal agencies before a disaster to ensure there are no gaps or overlaps in areas of 
responsibility and to increase the speed of response to victims with the greatest need after 
a disaster.177 The NLIHC recommends creating a clearer path for victims to receive aid 
from HUD and advocates for more pre-need planning. The NLIHC plan would create better 
solutions to disaster housing, but political pressure must be exerted to implement 
recommendations ahead of a disaster.  
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Another possible solution is one that FEMA employed in Guam after an earthquake 
and flooding in 2009. A rarely implemented law, discussed in Chapter II, allowed the 
agency to build permanent homes instead of temporary housing.178 Building these new 
houses was very expensive, but still less costly than other options. If FEMA had built new 
houses for victims of Hurricane Maria, modern building codes could have been enforced, 
thus mitigating potential problems in the future, and green energy could have been 
incorporated into the new structures. FEMA’s response to the Guam disaster shows that 
with political pressure, there is potential for the creation of permanent rather than 
temporary housing, thus reducing waste and redundancy.  
Politics can be difficult to navigate at both local and federal levels. In 2008, 
California’s Office of Emergency Services, along with the Department of Homeland 
Security and local governments, published the San Francisco Bay Area Regional 
Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP), which designates spheres of responsibility during 
a local disaster. Because the San Francisco Bay Area is so densely populated, and has many 
municipal governments and agencies, one cross-jurisdictional plan works best to maximize 
resources and minimize redundancies. The RECP relies on the Red Cross and FEMA to 
address shelter.179 However, HUD does not agree with turning disaster housing over to the 
Red Cross and FEMA. Instead, HUD believes that HUD itself should help victims find 
housing; HUD does not want local and state governments, funded through FEMA, to 
handle disaster housing.180 HUD maintains that it has the contacts and expertise at the 
local level to help low-income people and people with disabilities find housing, because 
that is HUD’s task on a day-to-day basis. Ongoing bureaucratic conflict between FEMA 
and HUD is a significant impediment to finding a political solution to post-disaster 
housing. 
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SPUR—formerly known as the San Francisco Bay Area Planning and Urban 
Research Association—is a nonprofit that focuses on urban planning for San Francisco, 
Oakland, and San Jose by researching, educating, and advocating for policies to make these 
cities more livable and resilient.181 SPUR issued a report in 2012 on the devastating 
potential of a San Francisco earthquake, and ways to foster community resilience. The 
report asked, “What will it take for San Franciscans to live safely in their homes after an 
earthquake? A significant amount of housing may be too damaged to live in while it’s being 
repaired. Residents may leave. And that will put the city’s recovery at risk.”182 The report 
offers two possible solutions to reduce the impact of an earthquake, both of which aim to 
make 95 percent of homes in the area safe enough to be habitable. The first solution is 
retrofitting current high-risk buildings, such as concrete buildings built before 1980, and 
addressing soft-story construction that has large, unreinforced open rooms, such as garages 
or stores, comprising the bottom floor of buildings. San Francisco passed legislation 
mandating that all three-story or greater wood buildings with five or more units built with 
a soft story be sheer-walled and bolted to their foundations by 2020. Ninety-nine percent 
of building owners have complied, thus reducing the chances of crippling damage to high-
risk housing stock that is largely inhabited by high-risk populations. However, this 
successful retrofit program does not solve all the problems of vulnerable buildings in San 
Francisco. For example, concrete buildings built prior to 1980 have not been inventoried 
in San Francisco, nor is there a clear way to retrofit that is not exorbitant to homeowners 
or the city, spotlighting the role that financial implications have on legislation, no matter 
how many people may benefit.183  
The second change recommended by the SPUR report is that building codes be 
softened temporarily after a disaster so that people are not forced to leave housing that can 
be “safe enough to stay” during repairs.184 This recommendation recognizes that the 
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chances for full economic recovery are greatly diminished if the majority of the population 
is unable to stay in the community. For example, using a fire escape as an entrance for up 
to a month while a home’s front entry is repaired would be considered safe enough after a 
disaster, though it would not be permitted under normal circumstances. In order to be 
implemented, the “safe enough to stay” strategy requires a set of post-disaster building 
standards that must be put in place before a disaster strikes. This is a political issue: changes 
cannot occur without legislation. Without political clout, legal issues will not be addressed 
and recommended solutions cannot be implemented.  
The SPUR report also discusses different housing options for survivors after a 
disaster in San Francisco: housing vouchers, interim housing placed in front of damaged 
properties or in open areas such as parks or vacant lots, and cruise ships docked in the 
bay.185 The report does not address alternate intermediate housing units as a solution, as 
New York City Emergency Management does, but focuses primarily on making existing 
structures safe enough to stay. However, if the “safe enough to stay” strategy is not written 
into law ahead of a disaster, people may still be forced to leave their homes. According to 
the SPUR report, in order for San Francisco to achieve full recovery without a huge 
economic impact triggered by loss of population, loss of housing stock, and loss of 
employment, 95 percent of the population must be able to stay in San Francisco during the 
rebuild portion of disaster recovery.186  It postulates that after a magnitude 7.2 earthquake, 
approximately 175,000 people would be displaced, 85,000 housing units would be 
destroyed by the earthquake, and an additional 6,000 would be lost in subsequent fires.  
The SPUR report further conjectures that 20 percent of the population would need 
disaster housing for at least several months, and some for up to five years, because of 
housing unit shortfall; 75 percent of housing units projected to be livable, while SPUR’s 
goal for the viability of San Francisco is 95 percent, thus leaving 20 percent of the units 
uninhabitable.187 The SPUR report discusses that many elderly people, new immigrants 
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and non-English speakers will be impacted.188 It is reasonable to assume that of the 
roughly 175,000 people displaced, more than half of them may need some sort of federal 
aid to get back on their feet.189 
Internationally, Christchurch, New Zealand, an oft-compared sister city to San 
Francisco, made a different set of choices after its populace suffered two devastating 
earthquakes close together. The government chose to remove almost all survivors from 
affected areas; in one red-tagged area, it bought out all but 74 residents. After the 
earthquakes, officials projected that, in the future, they would remove all residents who 
had houses that were still inhabitable in red-tagged areas due to the high cost of trucking 
in supplies such as water, and of removing waste.190 For example, it cost the local 
government $500,000 per year to have the sewage removed from the remaining 
residences.191 San Francisco officials should consider this to be important information: 
“Experts are sending this message: The building code does not protect cities from 
earthquakes nearly as much as you might think.”192 The primary thrust of the SPUR report 
is that it is possible to make most structures safe enough to stay, but San Francisco could 
suffer an earthquake that exceeds building codes parameters, similar to the 9.0 earthquake 
off of Japan. This points to the necessity of having off-grid temporary disaster housing as 
an option. 
                                                 
188 SPUR, 16. 
189 Some populations will clearly need to be moved to areas that have not been devastated. These 
populations include those who are incarcerated, live in group homes, or who need special accommodations, 
such as disabled. Although the SPUR report does not address these special-needs groups, these groups must 
be considered when planning for disaster housing. For example, where is the nearest jail/prison with 
available room that the county jail could move their inmates to? And what form of transportation will be 
available? Preplanning for these populations’ needs is important to address. 
190 Tina Law, “Infrastructure in Christchurch’s Red Zone to Remain―for Now,” Stuff, December 10, 
2015, https://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/74935108/infrastructure-in-christchurchs-red-zone-to-
remain--for-now. 
191 David Walker, “Ratepayers’ Bear Cost of Government’s Red Zone Confusion,” Stuff, March 8, 
2018, https://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-rebuild/102067846/ratepayers-bear-cost-of-
governments-red-zone-confusion. 
192 Thomas Fuller, Anjali Singhvi, and Josh Williams, “San Francisco’s Big Seismic Gamble,” New 
York Times, April 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/17/us/san-francisco-earthquake-
seismic-gamble.html. 
64 
Officials in New Zealand learned to reexamine building codes to verify that they 
are robust enough to keep people safe in buildings hit by earthquakes. They also learned 
that in addition to housing, it was important to offer wraparound services, such as 
budgeting, counseling, advocacy, and employment, to help people get back on their feet 
more quickly. They learned how to reduce the delay of distributing temporary disaster 
housing by creating premade units staged in strategic locations. New Zealand found that 
creating “new towns” to house displaced persons was not effective because people tend to 
want to stay as close to home as possible. And lastly, they clearly defined six stages of 
housing, from homelessness and “rough sleeping” through independent private housing.193 
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS  
Several sources from the literature emphasize the value of making it possible for 
residents to remain in their cities while rebuilding takes place.194 In “A Framework to 
Construct Post-disaster Housing,” Saumyang Patel and Makarand Hastak state, “It is 
indispensable to provide housing to victims in their own region to aid its social and 
economic redevelopment and rebuilding processes.”195 If residents leave, rebuilding and 
economic recovery takes longer. Kanu Das and Nagendra Kumar Sharma agree, and 
discuss the indirect damage of a disaster on people and their employment if they are not 
housed adequately.196 To reach its state requirement—that 95 percent of the population 
must remain in place after a disaster to stabilize communities and start the process of 
recovery—the SPUR report recommends four possibilities:  
1. Keep people in their homes whenever it is safely feasible 
2. If people cannot be kept in their homes, keep them in their neighborhoods 
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3. If this is not possible, keep people in their cities  
4. If these options are not possible, provide victims with a plan for returning 
to their communities.197 
C. SOCIAL FACTORS  
Among the social factors Jo da Silva considers is the evaluation of the 
vulnerabilities of potentially affected populations, and the laws that govern them. She 
identifies which jurisdiction has authority over the affected population, and whether that 
jurisdiction has plans in place. She recommends discerning ways to mitigate potential 
hazards in the future.198  
While disaster housing solutions will be different for urban versus rural 
communities and first world versus third world areas, it is important to realize that housing 
is a fundamental need and to factor in the human element. It is possible to benefit from 
relevant disaster housing models that have succeeded in different countries and for 
different socioeconomic backgrounds. Mary Comerio, a professor of architecture at the 
University of California, Berkeley, and author of an article titled “Housing Issues after 
Disasters,” states, “The common denominator in urban disasters is [that] housing and … 
recovery issues are quite different in cities than in rural areas, precisely because the losses 
are concentrated in densely populated areas and the housing loss not only represents a 
significant financial investment, but also a unique component of the urban 
infrastructure.”199  
In 2003, a devastating earthquake hit Bam, Iran. In the aftermath, Asal Kamani-
Fard, Mohd Hamdan Ahmad, and Dilshan Remaz Ossen completed a study to examine 
how temporary housing affected reconstruction. Results from this study show that having 
victims stay close to their homes sped up the recovery process. In addition, keeping disaster 
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victims close to their homes during rebuilding created a higher quality of construction 
because homeowners were there to verify the quality of the work. They found that having 
owners nearby resulted in a more satisfying rebuilding process overall.200  
Research conducted by Ruhizal Roosli, Jestin Nordin, and Geoff O’Brien on post-
disaster housing reconstruction in Malaysia recommends four strategies that should be 
incorporated for a successful outcome:  
1. Increase public awareness through outreach for input on housing options 
2. Create meetings and activities to carry out recommendations 
3. Create policy and planning that is relevant to disaster victims’ needs 
4. Consider the victims’ needs and create government policies in line with 
those needs, making sure that there are enough assistance programs to 
support the number of potential victims 
The authors stress that disaster housing without consideration for those being housed has 
failed in the past in Malaysia and that, for success, all stakeholders must work together. 
When all stakeholders work together, the explain, the government’s burden is reduced, 
resulting in better long-term outcomes.201 
Research shows that disaster housing recovery plans have a higher rate of success 
when there is resident buy-in, sometimes called the “bottom-up” approach, as opposed to 
government-mandated and contractor-created solutions—the “top-down” approach. 
Housing solutions are more likely to succeed when residents and neighbors feel they have 
a say in designing the options. This is clearly shown in an article by Adham Hany 
Abulnour, who explains that the top-down solution may neglect the concerns of the 
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affected populace.202 Abulnour found that “Top-down solutions tend to neglect cultural 
and local conditions as well as users’ needs because of the urgency to supply the housing 
units rapidly.”203 As Abulnour explains, “community-based approaches … are successful 
at integrating reconstruction efforts with development opportunities, thus maximizing the 
potential of investments.”204  
Gayani Karunasena and Raufdeen Rameezdeen agree with Abulnour. In their study, 
they found that the efficacy of disaster housing increases when end users’ opinions are 
considered.205 Comerio also agrees, noting, “The U.S. is facing a situation similar to what 
many developing countries have faced after massive disasters: how to house large 
displaced populations. The solution is often to lay down as many units of housing in a grid 
as quickly as possible. This is great for politicians and terrible for the people who end up 
living there.”206 A study by the Mississippi Alternative Housing Program reports that 
people who receive innovatively designed homes after living in trailers are more satisfied 
with them.207 This research indicates that buy-in from the people who have to live in these 
units for extended periods is important; bun-in improves overall quality of life under very 
difficult circumstances. 
After Katrina, FEMA realized that it needed options for disaster housing beyond 
rental vouchers and trailers. It created a design competition called the Alternate Housing 
Pilot Program (AHPP) and funded four projects.208 Two of the four designs, one in 
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Mississippi and the other in Alabama, were documented for strengths and weaknesses. The 
two final reports for the AHPP note that the implementation of housing designs faced 
multiple unforeseen barriers, including finding plots of land for the units, conforming to 
local building codes, and retrofitting units to make them ADA compliant. But overall, these 
units were better received by neighbors and inhabitants than FEMA trailers. Residents of 
these alternative disaster housing units were documented as enjoying the units more than 
disaster trailers, citing that there was enough room to have family members visit and to 
move furniture around, two key reasons that the units were deemed successful.209  
In “Best Practice Post-disaster Housing and Livelihood Recovery Interventions: 
Winners and Losers,” Mojgan Tafti and Richard Tomlinson discuss the possibility of 
temporary housing becoming permanent homes owned by survivors as one of several best 
practices.210 Unlike the disposable FEMA trailer, this option would increase the economic 
stability and long-term solvency of the country and is well worth considering. The World 
Bank considers survivors owning their homes to be the gold standard for long-term 
recovery, but not all people want or can afford to own their homes. Another key finding in 
the AHPP studies was that although the alternative housing units were originally built for 
occupants to buy and own, many occupants did not have the resources to do so. These 
results echo the research of Tafti and Tomlinson. In the end, all units in the Alabama AHPP 
were built as rentals, and some were offered to renters to buy.211 These units cost $180,000 
each to create, including planning, land, furniture, and program evaluation expenses. All 
monies generated from the sale of these homes were used to create more low-income 
housing.212  
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Lessons learned from the Alabama AHPP were similar to the findings of 
comparable studies—they emphasize the importance of having a vision and a plan 
(including building code standards), co-coordinating with all stakeholders, thinking about 
where the units will go (land banking), considering the quality of building materials and 
placement of housing before a disaster, and being prepared to be flexible after a disaster.213  
Learning from past disasters, the government of Japan has adopted a bottom-up 
disaster housing policy that reflects the importance the government places on community 
and family. It has enacted legislation that empowers each community to decide how 
temporary housing will look and where it will be placed, through a “menu” of options from 
which communities can choose ahead of need. It supports social and economic recovery 
by keeping families and communities together to maintain the social fabric and gives first 
preference to the housing needs of vulnerable populations to ensure can start the recovery 
process as quickly as possible. In practice, these policies were difficult to realize after the 
Fukushima triple disaster because the people needed to make such decisions did not remain 
in the affected areas.214 Japan is now able to critically evaluate the potential for natural 
disasters to trigger cascading events.215 
Mirroring the lessons learned from the New Zealand earthquakes, the NLIHC 
recommended that HUD ensure that wraparound services are available to those who need 
disaster housing. The NLIHC also recommended that HUD ensure that families and 
communities are kept together, echoing Japanese disaster policies.216 While the NLIHC is 
a progressive NGO, governments that have implemented these recommendations, such as 
those in Japan and New Zealand, have found them to be successful; they save money and 
maintain the social fabric of affected communities. 
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Social factors, such as providing wraparound services and including the victims 
and neighbors in housing design decisions, play a large but sometimes ignored role in the 
effective implementation of disaster housing. 
D. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS  
Current disaster housing solutions fall short of need, are very costly to taxpayers, 
and lack the holistic, integrated approach that individuals and communities need to recover 
after a disaster. While in the past FEMA has provided provisional housing, it has not been 
timely or cost-effective, and in some cases it has been unsafe. These fundamental 
components of disaster housing are intrinsic to success, and FEMA housing fails to meet 
them. There is no evidence that FEMA has considered using anything but the traditional 
trailer and vouchers as housing options. 
Improvements in technology for disaster housing are providing new options to 
explore. Many possible solutions to disaster housing address one or more of the problems 
identified in this thesis. For instance, several studies have investigated incorporating 
prefabricated materials and renewable technology, such as photovoltaic (PV) cells, 
compostable toilets, and water collection units, into the design of disaster housing units. 
One study, by Ling Dong et al., found that prefabrication led to a quicker dispatch of 
product at a lower cost, and that the use of renewable technology, such as PV cells, led to 
improved efficiencies. They created model units that were 85 percent prefabricated and, 
when disassembled, could be recycled or reused, substantially reducing waste.217 
Perrucci, Vazquez, and Aktas echo the need for prefabricated disaster housing units 
that use renewable technology. They explore options for local, renewable resources to 
create disaster housing, searching for “a structure that is low-cost, energy efficient, and one 
that uses local renewable or recycled materials, while at the same time being safe and 
providing shelter to its occupants from the elements.”218 These authors, having examined 
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best practices that would incorporate local climate and housing needs, recommend that 
since all countries are susceptible to disasters, governments need to have comprehensive 
disaster housing plans in place ahead of time to maximize resilience.219 
The following sections present just a few of the new designs that could be 
considered for disaster victims in the future. They are safe, green, easily modifiable, sturdy, 
weather-resistant, and can be quickly assembled without much instruction. While some 
may not be appropriate for high-density urban areas, others are, and could give victims and 
neighborhoods options for disaster housing. 
1. The Plastic Snap-Together House 
In Colombia, the company Conceptos Plásticos (Plastic Concepts) is fabricating 
unrecyclable plastic into building blocks and columns that can be used to construct houses 
of up to two stories. The material is a heat and sound insulator and is earthquake resistant. 
The company also has options for water and electrical service and offers roofing options 
that facilitate passive cooling in hot regions. In twenty-eight days, a crew of fifteen used 
these building blocks to build forty-two houses for victims of violent displacement in 
Colombia, with a per-home cost of $6,800. Conceptos Plásticos has won international 
awards and grants to continue its work providing modifiable homes for people in need.220 
As a building material for a temporary housing solution, the bricks are easily shippable, 
sturdy, easy to build with, can create many different floor plans, and use very few natural 
resources. If these blocks are preplaced in strategic staging areas when a disaster hits, they 
can be shipped within hours and assembled quickly to house those in need.221 
                                                 
219 Perrucci, Vazquez, and Aktas, 327. 
220 Nicholas Valencia, “This House Was Built in 5 Days Using Recycled Plastic Bricks,” trans. 
Amanda Pimenta, ArchDaily, May 1, 2017, https://www.archdaily.com/869926/this-house-was-built-in-5-
days-using-recycled-plastic-bricks. 
221 Lucy Sherriff, “These Real Life Lego Houses Are Built from Bricks Made of Recycled Plastic,” 







2. House Arc 
The House Arc prefabricated housing system comprises 90 percent lightweight 
recyclable steel tubes. The housing unit ships as a 3’ x 4’ x 10’ flat pack box and weighs 
just 3,000 pounds. When set up, the roughly 150 square-foot units resemble trailers but can 
resist hurricane winds. They can be set up on uneven ground and have many windows to 
let in light. The housing units are off-grid and include built-in water catchments and solar 
power units.222  
3. The IKEA Option 
Swedish ready-to-build furniture company IKEA, in conjunction with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for, has created a temporary housing model that is solar-
powered and safe—the walls are solid and can even resist knife blades. The cost per unit 
is $1,300, versus $150,000 for each FEMA trailer.223 Each IKEA unit can sleep a family 
of five and lasts for three years, which is longer than the useful lives of tents or trailers. 
The units can be assembled in four hours by four people and are being used extensively 
and successfully in the Middle East and Ethiopia; the IKEA unites even won London’s 
Design Museum Design of the Year Award.224 There are downsides to this model, 
however: the units are not equipped with a kitchen, and a Swiss city that attempted to use 
the units to house an influx of refugees found them unviable due to a lower fire-resistance 
rating than regulations mandate.225  
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4. The Container Option 
In an article for Frontiers of Architectural Research, Yan Hong examines the use 
of shipping containers for temporary housing in China after a devastating earthquake in 
2008 that destroyed 3.47 million homes. He found that shipping containers can be 
customized by joining or splitting units to meet the specific needs of people being housed. 
He also found that these units could be rapidly deployed and easily assembled after a 
disaster, which helps stabilize the population quickly and assists with recovery.226 
Shipping containers could be a potential solution, as there are many containers waiting for 
uses on the coasts. They are sturdy, stackable, can be made “green,” and are easily 
modifiable. They can also be made to be off-grid. 
E. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS  
When considering environmentally sound solutions to disaster housing, densely 
populated areas need solutions that take land constraints into account. In 2014, two years 
after Superstorm Sandy, New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM) took a hard 
look at post-disaster housing and came up with alternative solutions. NYCEM reviewed 
the FEMA practice of using approved vendors to order cookie-cutter trailers as needed and 
found that New York City needed a different product: stackable units that maximize the 
use of limited open space. Discussing local housing needs, the NYCEM report states: “The 
Interim Housing Unit must be rapidly deployable; transportable by truck, rail, and by cargo 
ship; and must be able to be disassembled and stored off-site for future reassembly and re-
use.”227 In addition, NYCEM indicates a need for prefabricated, modular housing—which 
will cut down on assembly and transportation time—that still conforms to local building 
codes, and housing of high enough quality to last beyond the temporary housing unit’s 
eighteen-month lifespan. NYCEM considered ADA mandates and fire codes when 
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developing its plan. It requires that the prefabricated units connect to preexisting 
infrastructure such as water and sewage, if available, and have other options if the 
infrastructure is not functioning.228 NYCEM understands that New York City’s aging 
infrastructure might not be operational after a large disaster and is planning for 
contingencies that would facilitate housing with as few barriers as possible. While NYCEM 
has developed a comprehensive disaster housing plan, the plan has not been tested yet. 
In “Re-thinking Material Selection for Large Scale Post-disaster Reconstruction,” 
Giulia Celentano et al. examined fifteen large-scale post-disaster housing projects from 
2004 to 2011. They found that “by rethinking material selection … it is possible to 
maximize the use of the available resources, overcoming the challenges faced on post-
disaster reconstruction project while providing a rapid sustainable response to the affected 
population.”229 Experts in Japan are also exploring the idea of a holistic approach to 
disaster housing that would include open spaces for housing along with services for victims 
that would help them with recovery; they are also exploring the option of relocating 
communities, as needed, to areas that would be affected less by earthquakes and their 
aftermath.230 
While sustainable housing is not FEMA’s primary goal in creating temporary 
disaster housing, a sustainable housing model provides a useful framework for planning 
disaster housing that could transition into permanent housing if needed. This approach 
could also reduce the costs of building disaster housing. In her summary of lessons learned 
from Aceh, Indonesia, after the 2004 tsunami, da Silva discusses approaches for building 
community resilience after disasters, especially with regard to sustainable housing in Asia 
and Africa. da Silva employs a three-step approach: planning, design, and construction.231 
This differs from FEMA’s four-phase framework for emergency management: prepare, 
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mitigate, respond, and recover, a model that may not be as applicable to disaster housing 
as da Silva’s, because she is discussing rebuilding communities rather than housing people 
temporarily.232  
During the design phase in planning for post-disaster housing, da Silva looks at 
possible site options to determine whether people will be able to safely live there long term 
and whether the affected communities need to be relocated, investigating types of 
construction for sustainability, quality-of-life standards, and building requirements for the 
region. After cost and construction time have been evaluated, the plan is implemented.233 
da Silva considers who will build the housing, what materials will be used, how the 
materials will be obtained, and what means of conveyance will be used. Once the materials 
are onsite, da Silva addresses how to determine who will manage the project to ensure it 
matches the plan and design is addressed, as well as who will maintain quality of 
workmanship. da Silva recommends having a process in place to turn over the structures 
to recipients after they have been completed.234 While all these steps take time, it would 
be helpful if they were incorporated into disaster housing. 
Because of the density of its cities, the Japanese government also procures existing 
vacant units to house disaster victims. But, as in the United States, this policy only works 
when the supply is greater than the demand, and sometimes it is not feasible due to lack of 
availability or cost. If a disaster hit Tokyo or New York City, the cost of housing those in 
need in existing units would be cost prohibitive because the demand would exceed the 
supply. Also, finding areas in which to place temporary housing in cities would be difficult 
for two reasons: lack of open spaces, and the difficulty to access utilities such as water, 
power, and waste disposal, which makes it impossible to install existing temporary 
structures and keep people close to home. But in many areas in the United States, the 
voucher system for short-term rentals is a viable option and commonly used through an 
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application process online. For this to work, however, rental units must be available for a 
reasonable amount. 
F. LEGAL FACTORS  
Legal lessons learned from recent disasters should also be considered when 
weighing future solutions. To address disaster housing in the future, the Japanese 
government is investigating the option of modifying the existing law to increase the amount 
of time that people can remain in temporary housing. It would mandate that housing units 
be better suited to the individuals who have to live in them; this potentially means 
increasing the size of the units, giving units more storage as well as flexible floor plans, 
and optimizing the potential for different types of units to accommodate elderly and 
disabled people. Problems with the existing law, enacted in 1947, were discussed by the 
Japanese government after the Hanshin earthquake in 1995, but were not modified to make 
for a better outcome after the Fukushima triple disaster in 2011, the scale and complexity 
of which were beyond what officials or power plant executives could have imagined.235 
In the planning phase, da Silva discusses the need for context, taking physical, 
social, economic, and political factors into account. In contrast to da Silva’s orderly steps 
of planning, FEMA’s response plan to Hurricane Katrina had not been sufficiently 
developed, so it was not implemented. Instead, the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster 
Recovery found that FEMA engaged in inconsistent ways: FEMA continually changed 
requirements and deadlines that victims had to adhere, which later led to lawsuits.236 
FEMA’s ongoing, ad hoc responses to disasters with regard to housing are puzzling. If 
there was a clear path to housing aid for victims of a disaster that was streamlined, 
consistent, and predictable, it would greatly accelerate the recovery process. 
G. SUMMARY 
Possible solutions to past disaster housing problems presented in this chapter—
based on the PSETEL analysis—are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Disaster Housing Solutions Based on PESTEL Analysis 
Political • Coordinate with all stakeholders to reduce areas of overlap or 
gaps in coverage, in particular between FEMA and HUD 
• Create clear path for victims to receive aid 
• Create a consistent disaster housing response 
• Create permanent housing, when appropriate, instead of 
temporary housing 
• Preplan for vulnerable communities 
Economic • Use resources that are local or abundant to create disaster 
housing 
• Allow victims to supplement vouchers so that they can find units 
better suited to them 
• Create disaster housing that can transition to permanent housing 
• Land bank areas so there are places to put disaster housing when 
there is a need 
• Create vouchers for rentals when housing stock is available 
Social • Offer wraparound services to victims 
• Reduce delay of distributing disaster housing by storing units in 
key locations 
• Evaluate vulnerable populations ahead of disasters 
• Allow victims and neighbors to have buy-in on their disaster 
housing 
• Keep communities together and close to home 
• Give disaster housing victims the option to purchase their 
disaster housing 
Technological • Increase size and change design of disaster units to accommodate 
the elderly and disabled 
• Create an off-grid disaster housing option 
• Create green disaster housing options 
• Create prefabricated disaster housing for quicker deployment 
• Create rapidly deployable disaster housing options 
• Make options transportable by truck, rail, or ship 
• Make options easily storable 
• Create stackable disaster housing 
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Environmental • Remove all victims from disaster area to rebuild quickly 
• Keep people close to services and employment 
• Remove populations from dangerous areas such as flood zones 
when possible 
Legal • Increase the amount of time victims can stay in disaster housing 
• Create legislation that allows for flexible floorplans 
• Create legislation that would mandate retrofitting high-risk 
buildings 
• Create legislation to make buildings safe enough to stay in after a 
disaster 





V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This research began with a basic question: How can government agencies provide 
effective post-disaster housing in densely populated urban areas when the infrastructure 
has been damaged? Disasters create a need for housing not only for the people who 
continue to live and work in the affected area but also volunteers who come to provide aid 
and help to rebuild. This thesis used the PESTEL model to explore the research question 
and to identify policy solutions that might serve communities in the future. This concluding 
chapter also employs the PESTEL model to summarize findings, call attention to past 
practices that might inform future policy, and identify subject areas for additional research. 
A. POLITICAL SOLUTIONS 
(1) Problems  
The head of FEMA is a political appointee who serves at the discretion of the 
current administration, which reduces his or her sphere of influence. Elected officials are 
often not motivated to allocate funding to disaster preparedness until their constituency is 
directly impacted by a disaster; this results in a situation of reaction rather than prevention. 
History has shown that FEMA and HUD have a contentious relationship with regard to 
implementation of post-disaster housing. At the local level, neighbors have blocked the 
deployment of trailers (as a result of NIMBY) because of fears of increased crime and a 
reduction in their home values, as noted in Chapter II. 
(2) Potential Solutions  
• Politicians must pass legislation that provides for post-disaster housing 
ahead of time, rather than addressing this issue on an ad hoc basis after a 
disaster has devastated an area. One example of optimal pre-disaster 
planning might be to partner with Job Corps to create and store post-
disaster housing. Job Corps would also provide a deployable workforce to 
be mobilized when a disaster hits. Job Corps is funded by the federal 
government and thus independent of any particular disaster and has 
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campuses in every state. This change would shift the political 
implementation of post-disaster housing from reactive to proactive.  
• Government officials should take NIMBY into consideration ahead of 
time. Organizing neighborhood focus groups to generate design ideas 
would potentially expand the number of areas where this housing would 
be accepted and welcomed.  
• FEMA should meet with local and state governments to create workgroups 
to design disaster housing prototypes that are appropriate for the climate 
and density of the potentially devastated area. These prototypes should 
then be vetted through neighborhood groups and those populations that 
tend to require disaster housing. Numerous studies show that shifting 
focus to local preplanning results in better outcomes for victims and the 
region. This would allow FEMA to maintain oversight while increasing 
buy-in at the local level. In turn, this would increase the potential for 
appropriate disaster housing for the areas of deployment; research 
demonstrates that one-size housing does not fit all situations. 
B. ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS 
(1) Problems  
As noted in Chapter II, current disaster housing solutions are expensive to purchase, 
deploy, and maintain, and do not last a long time. Chapter II it also discussed that FEMA’s 
rental voucher solution relies on vacant housing being affordable and available, which is 
unrealistic in crowded urban spaces. The poor, the elderly, and people with disabilities are 
the ones who have the greatest need for disaster housing, and these populations tend to lack 
resources that can help bridge the time gap between the disaster and disaster housing 
deployment. There is currently a lack of workers in the building and construction trades; 
after a disaster, there will be an even higher demand for builders, thus increasing the costs 
and wait times for those who need help rebuilding.  
81 
(2) Potential Solutions  
• If post-disaster housing is already on hand, it will be less expensive than 
paying top dollar for housing solutions after a disaster, when there is a 
greater demand for it to be produced and delivered quickly.  
• Including Job Corps in the building of post-disaster housing would be 
another possible means of saving money, since this workforce is already 
being paid, but not producing a product. Job Corps would know the 
product and its systems, be deployable, and be able to modify the units on-
site as needed for the victims’ use. This workforce could also supplement 
the dearth of builders and potentially assist with home repairs, reducing 
both the cost and the wait time. 
C. SOCIAL SOLUTIONS 
(1) Problems  
A community needs to maintain its cohesion in order to recover. SPUR estimates 
that 95 percent of people need to stay in the community if the community is to recover. 
While housing is critical, since it allows victims to stay near their homes, this is often just 
the start of the community’s recovery. A wide range of social services, called wraparound 
services, such as counseling and medical help, are needed to enhance community recovery, 
as noted in Chapter III’s discussion of New Zealand’s disaster housing. Since many victims 
are elderly, poor, or disabled, these kinds of services are crucial for their recovery. People 
who are not given choices in their housing options do not recover as quickly. Additionally, 
people tend to converge on the disaster site to offer aid, creating an added need for housing, 
straining transportation networks, and creating waste disposal problems in the disaster 
zone. There is also a need for barriers to keep people from nefarious activities while 
buildings are being repaired. The needs of incarcerated people will have to be addressed, 
as well as the needs of those in hospitals.  
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(2) Potential Solutions  
• HUD should identify and locate the people and populations that will need 
disaster housing ahead of time so that housing solutions can be created and 
stored for fast deployment. 
• HUD should identify and locate the wraparound services that are key to 
helping vulnerable populations recover from a disaster. 
• Job Corps should identify and locate open spaces that can be used for 
disaster housing ahead of time to assist with speedy deployment of 
housing after a disaster. 
• Local governments should create a deployment plan that includes the 
above factors identifying the stakeholders necessary for buy-in. 
• Job Corps should create prototypes that neighborhood groups can review 
to avoid NIMBY issues after a disaster. 
• Job Corps should allow those who will use the disaster housing to have a 
say in the layout of their units.  
• Job Corps should make the disaster housing easily modifiable so 
populations with special needs can be accommodated easily. 
• Job Corps should create off-grid housing that will allow people to stay 
locally after a disaster without relying on the potentially damaged 
infrastructure. 
• SFDEM should identify populations that will need to be moved to areas 
without damage for survival and safety, such as those who are incarcerated 
or who are living in group homes.   
• SFDEM should create departure plans and areas of refuge for them. 
83 
• SFDEM should create a plan for housing workers who converge on the 
area after a disaster. 
D. TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS 
(1) Problems  
The infrastructure of the United States is failing. Trailers, one of FEMA’s standard 
post-disaster housing solutions, will not work in a densely populated urban environment 
where an already failing infrastructure is further impacted by a disaster.  
(2) Potential Solutions 
• FEMA should go beyond trailers to explore cutting-edge technological 
advances in post-disaster housing.  
• Technology could be used to create off-grid housing that has a low impact 
on the environment, is easy to move and store, can be modified to meet the 
needs of the victims, and is stackable for high-density areas.  
• There could be several models to choose from so that recipients feel that 
they are part of the solution. Also, by creating several models, testing 
could be done to determine the options that are the most useful in various 
circumstances.  
• Technological solutions can be developed to streamline the process of 
obtaining post-disaster housing to ensure the system is easier for all 
victims to navigate. 
E. ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS 
(1) Problems  
The climate is changing and the frequency of natural disasters is increasing, along 
with their destructive power. Space is already limited in cities, and people are continuing 
to move to them, making it extremely difficult to place disaster housing in these densely 
packed urban environments. As cities expand, many more people live in increasingly 
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hazardous areas—such as in flood zones, near earthquake faults, and in areas vulnerable to 
wildfire. FEMA trailers are single-use, not recyclable or reusable, and end up as garbage 
in landfills.  
(2) Potential Solutions 
• The United States should create disaster housing that is environmentally 
friendly so that housing solutions do not create disposal problems.  
• Disaster housing should be stackable for cities where space is at a 
premium.  
• Disaster housing should have the option of being off-grid in case the 
infrastructure goes down in a given disaster area. 
F. LEGAL SOLUTIONS 
(1) Problems  
FEMA’s system for delivering post-disaster housing aid is arcane, overly 
complicated, and inconsistently implemented, making it difficult for victims to receive 
necessary help. FEMA has had difficulty partnering with other federal agencies, as well as 
state and local governments.   
(2) Potential Solutions 
• Legislation should be implemented at the federal level that would allocate 
resources to disaster-stricken areas in a more fair and equal way, while 
simplifying the process.  
• The federal government should enact legislation that would empower 
federal agencies as well as state and local governments to create 
appropriate post-disaster housing in a timely manner. For example, at the 
local level, Job Corps could build and deploy disaster housing, which 
would be funded by the federal government.  
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G. CONCLUSION  
Researchers and experts have noted that there is no one disaster housing solution 
that fits all needs. But by examining disaster housing through the PESTEL framework, this 
research gained insights into key components that should be considered, balanced, and 
factored into solutions.  
Disasters are going to be a part of the future in the United States and every other 
country, and post-disaster housing that is safe and meets the needs of communities is a 
critical part of the recovery process. As seen in Japan, disasters can trigger cascading events 
that exponentially compound the original disaster. Individuals and communities recover 
faster and more completely when people have a say in their housing, and when they are 
able to stay close to home, near friends, family, and work. These are valuable lessons that 
can benefit the United States and the rest of the global population. With the certainty that 
our country is going to experience disasters in the future, it is imperative that we plan for 
post-disaster housing that is cost-effective, keeps people close to their communities, is safe, 
and provides a foundation that helps individuals and communities make complete 
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